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The Bunk House Rules: A Materialist 
Approach to Legal Consciousness in the 
Context of Migrant Workers’ Housing in 
Ontario
ADRIAN SMITH*
In this article, I tackle the controversy surrounding an application to convert an abandoned 
school into housing for migrant agricultural workers in Ontario. I examine how the written 
reactions of community residents to a proposed municipal zoning by-law amendment convey 
and invoke understandings of the legal regulation of temporary labour migration. Viewed 
through a legal consciousness analytical lens that has been reconstituted to attend to the 
material practices and contexts underpinning residents’ responses (a materialist approach 
to legal consciousness), the submissions intervene in the organization and regulation of 
agricultural labour. While rehearsing well-worn, racist colonial tropes, these responses 
(re)produce material outcomes affecting the working and social lives of migrant farm workers. 
I argue that residents’ overwhelming opposition to the bunk house proposal re-inscribes 
and even extends the unfree labour conditions in which these workers toil and dwell. In this 
way, residents perpetuate growers’ control not merely of labour power but also of racialized 
labouring bodies, deepening workers’ regulatory immobilization and hyper-exploitation. 
* Assistant Professor, Department of Law & Legal Studies, Institute of Political Economy, 
Carleton University. I am grateful for the thoughtful feedback of the anonymous reviewers 
and editor Stepan Wood, as well as for the erudite support of Dayna Scott through the 
multiple iterations of this article. 
(2015) 52 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL864
Dans cet article, j’aborde la contre erse qui entoure un projet de transformer en Ontario une 
école désaffectée en pavillon d’hébergement pour travailleurs agricoles migrants. J’examine 
la manière dont les réactions par écrit de la population locale à une proposition d’amendement 
d’un règlement municipal de zonage représentent en l’invoquant leur interprétation du 
cadre juridique de la réglementation touchant la migration de la main-d’œuvre temporaire. 
Examinés sous le prisme analytique de la conscience juridique reconstitué pour expliquer la 
pratique et le contexte matériels qui sous-tendent la réaction des résidents (une approche 
matérialiste de la conscience juridique), ces éléments s’interposent dans l’organisation et la 
réglementation du travail agricole. Tout en rabâchant des tropes éculés racistes et coloniaux, 
ces réactions entraînent des conséquences matérielles qui affectent la vie professionnelle 
et sociale des travailleurs agricoles migrants. Je prétends que l’opposition démesurée des 
résidents à la proposition d’aménager un pavillon dortoir rétablit et même aggrave le manque 
de liberté des conditions de travail et d’hébergement de ces travailleurs. Les résidents 
perpétuent ainsi la mainmise des exploitants agricoles non seulement sur la main-d’œuvre, 
mais également sur son ethnicité, ce qui approfondit l’emprise de la réglementation sur les 
travailleurs et leur surexploitation. 
Every colonized people … finds itself face to face with the language of the civilizing nation.1
A CONTROVERSY OVER A PROPOSAL to convert a former elementary school 
located in a small Ontario farming community into housing for Caribbean 
migrant agricultural workers highlights commonplace understandings of the 
legal regulation of temporary labour migration. In late 2011, Norfolk Select 
Potato Company (“Norfolk Potato”) offered to purchase an abandoned school 
in the hamlet of Windham Centre in Norfolk County in rural Southwestern 
Ontario. The offer was conditional upon a Norfolk County zoning by-law 
1. Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (New York: Grove, 1967) at 9 [Fanon, Black 
Skin, White Masks]. 
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amendment to authorize the change in land use.2 Local residents organized 
a letter writing campaign and secured ninety-three signatures on a petition 
opposing the bunk house. Faced with this overwhelming community response, 
Norfolk Potato ultimately withdrew its application. The residents’ letters claimed 
the proposed by-law amendment would circumvent migrant worker supervision 
and monitoring by employers and threaten the safety and well-being of local 
residents and the community at large. Windham Centre residents feared that a 
decision to approve the application would unleash “armies of offshore labour” in 
their otherwise tranquil community.3 In one resident’s words: 
There is no way for the farmers who have made this application to monitor and 
supervise the amount of men proposed to be housed on this site if they are not 
THERE! It has absolutely nothing to do with the race of these men, they could be 
white, or green with purple spots. That many men, housed in that manner, away 
from their families, is asking for trouble. Trouble which our little hamlet should not 
be responsible for as it wasn’t US who asked for them to be housed there.4
Of the written submissions, only one expressed unqualified support for the 
bunk house proposal. In calling for “cooler, saner and logical heads” to “prevail,” 
the lone supporter characterized the considerable volume of objections as “sort 
of sickening.” As the supporter pleaded to municipal officials: “Please, do not 
2. Michelle Ruby, “Migrant bunkhouse plan for Windham Centre meets with resistance,” 
Simcoe Reformer (18 November 2011), online: <www.simcoereformer.ca/ArticleDisplay.
aspx?e=3375128>; Monte Sonnenberg, “Potato company defends bunkhouse plan for 
former school,” Simcoe Reformer (22 November 2011), online: <www.simcoereformer.
ca/2011/11/22/potato-company-defends-bunkhouse-plan-for-former-school>; Monte 
Sonnenberg, “Bunkhouse response called ‘xenophobic,’” Simcoe Reformer (11 December 
2011), online: <www.simcoereformer.ca/ArticleDisplay.aspx?e=3399494>; Monte 
Sonnenberg, “Company puts kibosh on bunkhouse proposal,” Simcoe Reformer (15 
December 2011), online: <www.simcoereformer.ca/2011/12/15/company-puts-kibosh-on-
bunkhouse-proposal> [Sonnenberg, “Bunkhouse proposal”]. 
3. Email from HG to Norfolk County Council (30 November 2011) in Norfolk County 
Planning & Economic Development Department, “Application to amend the Township of 
Delhi Zoning By-Law 1-DE 80 affecting the lands described as Lot 6, Part Lot 7, Lots 10 
to 13, Part Lot 16, Block 3, Plan 48B, Geographic Township of Windham, Norfolk County 
to permit housing of agricultural workers and address inconsistencies in zone mapping” (12 
October 2007), online: <norfolk.civicweb.net/FileStorage/005FC8DD8DA0490CA9067233
F330BF5D-WorkspacePED%2011-173.pdf> [Application]. I have adopted the convention of 
using the initials of community residents for identification purposes in footnotes, balancing 
the need for proper attribution and partial anonymity. I also have sought to provide modest 
grammatical alterations to facilitate readability of written submissions.  
4. Email from PM to Norfolk County Council (4 December 2011) in Application, supra note 3 
[emphasis in original].
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react to what is nothing less [than] blatant, albeit sometimes coded, racis[t] 
remarks and fears.”5
The letters invite deeper reflection on the processes and practices through which 
contemporary racism works. In taking a closer look at the written submissions, 
I examine the discursive framing of local opposition. However, my aim is not to 
fetishize language. Nor is it to trivialize specific strands of oppositional discourse. 
Instead, I undertake an examination of the opposition to deepen understanding 
of the ways in which the legal consciousness of local residents intervene in the 
material relations and conditions of temporary labour migration to Canada. 
Encoded within residents’ legal consciousness are conceptions not merely of the 
legal rights and entitlements of migrant agricultural workers but more profoundly 
of the configuration of Canada’s agrarian labour regime. The political and legal 
mechanisms of control imposed on the deployment of migrant labour power are 
also extended over the bodies of the workers themselves. In this way, the specific 
framings of residents’ opposition within the material context of the proposed 
amendment, the rules for siting bunk houses, and wider relations prove deeply 
contentious. By functioning to legitimate and enforce highly unequal relations, 
residents’ responses intervene to intensify migrant labour unfreedom. 
The analysis develops in four parts. Part I commences with an overview 
of the ways agricultural production is structured through the use of “unfree 
migrant labour” in the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program (“SAWP”), 
Canada’s long-standing temporary labour migration scheme serving horticultural 
production. Part II articulates a framework of analysis based on a reconstituted 
approach to the study of legal consciousness. Framed around anti-racist 
Marxist theoretical insights, I articulate an analytical framework that takes 
seriously discourse, ideology, and most crucially, material practices and context. 
A materialist approach to legal consciousness serves to deepen appreciation of the 
relations and practices that underpin, and the contexts that surround, cognitive 
understandings and translate into action. In Part III, applying a materialist legal 
consciousness lens, I organize residents’ written responses into two primary 
categories: (1) migrant worker supervision and monitoring and (2) personal 
safety, sexual harassment, physical violence, and other illicit activities. Grounded 
in colonial tropes, residents’ invocations and representations of law re-inscribe 
and even extend migrant labour unfreedom. This has real implications for the 
politico-legal regulation of migrant labour, in terms of the exaction of labour 
5. Email from RK to Norfolk County Council (23 November 2011) in Application, 
supra note 3.  
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power and especially the perpetuation of growers’ control. In Part IV, I attend to 
these effects.6 
I. URBAN PLANNING AND THE REGULATION OF MIGRANT 
LABOUR
As noted in the introduction, Norfolk Potato’s offer to convert a shuttered school 
building into housing for migrant workers was conditional upon an amendment 
to the local zoning by-law.7 The by-law amendment was required because the 
lands in question were zoned primarily as “rural industrial,” under which only 
specifically listed uses were permitted.8 “Bunk houses” are listed, and thus 
would constitute a permitted use, but only on the condition that “occupants 
are employed predominantly by the farm operation where the bunk house is 
located.”9 Similarly, the definition of “bunk house” in the zoning by-law for 
Norfolk County states that: 
“BUNK HOUSE” shall mean a building or part of a building used for the temporary 
accommodation of seasonal farm workers provided such accommodation does 
not serve as the principal place of residence of an occupant and the bunkhouse is 
located on the farm on which the seasonal workers are employed. A mobile home or 
recreational vehicle may be used for the purposes of a bunk house.10
In Norfolk Potato’s proposal, the workers would be housed away from the 
farm operation.11  According to the provisions of Ontario’s Planning Act, the 
decision to amend a zoning by-law can only be taken by the municipal council 
after a duly-executed public consultation process, including a notice period, an 
opportunity to provide comments, and a public meeting on the application.12 
6. To be clear, the analytical task of this article is not to validate the specific migrant housing 
proposal nor to defend the specific rules for siting a bunkhouse. Indeed, I largely remain 
silent on the relative merits of the proposal.   
7. A zoning by-law sets out a detailed set of rules about how lands may be used and where 
buildings may be located within a municipality. It is intended to implement a policy 
direction set out in the municipality’s Official Plan. An application for an amendment to the 
zoning by-law triggers a public consultation process under the Planning Act. See Planning 
Act, RSO 1990, c P13 [Planning Act].
8. Norfolk County, by-law No 1-Z-2011, Comprehensive Zoning By-Law, (2011), s 7.5.
9. Ibid, s 7.5.1(e) [emphasis omitted].
10. Ibid, s 2.23 [emphasis in original].
11. The company was seeking a site-specific special provision permitting the housing of 
agricultural workers as an additional use in the Rural-Institutional Zone. For the full 
application materials, see Application, supra note 3. 
12. Planning Act, supra note 7, ss 10-14.
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Once notified, local residents undertook a letter writing campaign directed at 
the municipality, which included the submission of a ninety-three signature 
petition.13 All but one of the seventeen letters expressed unequivocal opposition 
to the application,14 leading Norfolk Potato to withdraw its application.15
The relationship between the legal rules on siting bunk houses and the 
written submissions of residents calls out for deeper exploration in the context 
of the legal regulation of migrant labour in Canada. What should be made of 
the impact of the bunk house rules, including on migrant agrarian labour? And 
more to the point, does writing a submission opposing the migrant housing 
proposal constitute the act that requires evaluation and explanation? Or 
should the evaluative process be aimed at the inaction of Norfolk Potato and 
Canadian state officials in the failure to provide (adequate?) housing for migrant 
agricultural workers? In the first framing, the inquiry is focused on the ideological 
representations of the respondents, on the inclusionary and exclusionary practices 
that those representations serve(d), or on both. In the second framing, the focus 
of inquiry would shift away from the respondents, perhaps altogether, and hone 
in on the role of the Canadian state and agri-capital. 
I situate my line of inquiry within an analysis of the processes and practices 
through which racism works. Robert Miles and Malcolm Brown understand 
racism to have two dimensions. First, assuming initially at least an analytical—
as opposed to inductive—understanding, racism constitutes an “ideological, 
representational phenomenon” in which groups or so-called races of people are 
attributed with certain biological or somatic characteristics that are ascribed 
negative values or deemed to produce negative outcomes.16 Second, as ideological 
13. According to one submission, “A petition has circulated through the Hamlet of Windham 
Centre. In the designated Hamlet area there are 64 houses. We have received at least one 
signature from 53 households, 7 we could not make contact, and 3 houses are currently 
unoccupied. Only one person refused to sign, and they are an employee of one of the farmers 
who own Norfolk Select Potato Co. We have many more signatures from the immediate 
surrounding area.” See Letter from KG & LG to Norfolk County Council (5 December 
2011) in Application, supra note 3.
14. Email from RK to Norfolk County Council (23 November 2011) in Application, 
supra note 3.  
15. Sonnenberg, “Bunkhouse proposal,” supra note 2.
16. Robert Miles & Malcolm Brown, Racism, 2nd ed (London: Routledge, 2003) at 103-104. 
As Miles and Brown stress, “[T]here is no necessary logical correlation between cognition 
and action. The conceptual ability to make these distinctions serves the interests of analytical 
accuracy and of formulating potentially successful interventionist strategies intended to 
negate both racist ideologies and the disadvantage that accrues from exclusion” (ibid at 103).
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content, racism may produce the conditions that create unfreedom in the labour 
market.17 These two logics of racism, although typically “complementary and 
inseparable,” must be demonstrated, not assumed.18 On this reading, writing 
a submission against a housing proposal designed to support a decidedly 
marginalized group does not in itself amount to racism in either sense; it is not 
necessarily even distasteful. In the same way, an expression of support for such 
a proposal can occur with the invocation of racist understandings or practices. 
Thus, an evaluation of the content of those submissions must be undertaken 
to determine whether they adhere to racist representations or exclusions. 
17. As Miles and Brown put it, “[I]ts articulation as an ideology has legitimated the mode of 
production and racialised … the labour market.” See Miles & Brown, ibid at 120.
18. Ibid at 120. My understanding, while borrowing heavily from the approach articulated 
by Miles and Brown, differs in an important respect. Miles and Brown arrive at their 
understanding by drawing a sharp distinction between on one side “ideological content” 
and representation, which is derived cognitively, and on the other “function,” understood as 
taking action to disadvantage and exclude—or what they term “exclusionary practice” (ibid 
at 103). For them, the presumption of an innate link between racism as representation and 
practice undermines the concept’s explanatory potential for the linkage is not natural; it must 
be shown not presumed. Taking this as a point of departure, one explicitly framed by the 
desire to take seriously the call for “analytical accuracy,” Miles and Brown are right to stress 
that the linkage must be demonstrated and not merely taken as given (ibid). Notwithstanding 
this insistence, it is not necessary—nor is it sustainable—to draw so fine a distinction. As 
they rightly acknowledge, racism as ideology “often exists in a mutually reinforcing unity 
with exclusionary practice” (ibid). The task of determining whether linkage or unity exists 
is not an easy one. In Part I, below, I discuss the complexity of the inclusion-exclusion 
distinction. The distinction between action and inaction is equally fraught.  Certain nuances 
exist in distinguishing action from inaction especially as not doing something can itself be 
a political decision—or the political act of not acting—which upholds or reinforces the 
status quo. When status quo relations are characterized by such gross material inequalities 
as endemic to capitalism, the tyranny of inaction is indeed unconscionable. Context proves 
crucially important here and as such, despite the laudable intentions of Miles and Brown, 
inductive reasoning cannot be jettisoned altogether. As such, the approach adopted here 
may appear more consistent with Miles in his earlier work, but it more properly follows the 
insights of Terry Eagleton and in a certain respect Slavoj Žižek. See Robert Miles, Capitalism 
and Unfree Labour: Anomaly or Necessity? (London: Tavistock, 1987).
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Because racism takes on different meanings across space and time,19 a contextualized 
analysis also is needed. Racism therefore is about both content and context.20
A contextualized approach takes aim at the entire rich fabric of communal 
and social relations. Terry Eagleton, aligning with philosopher Slavoj Žižek, 
complicates the two-dimensional account of racism. Racist ideology, as Eagleton 
once put it, is “not just a matter of what I think about a situation; it is somehow 
inscribed in that situation itself. It is no good my reminding myself that I am 
opposed to racism as I sit down on a park bench marked ‘Whites Only’; by the act 
of sitting on it, I have supported and perpetuated racist ideology. The ideology, so 
to speak, is in the bench, not in my head.”21 Racism materializes in social activity 
and thus we must remain attentive to social formations and material conditions 
within which ideas are promulgated. Further, in contextualizing the content of 
residents’ submissions, there is a need to take account of historical contingency 
and specificity. The extent to which a given ideological representation takes on 
racist connotations is contingent upon whether it works to extend, uphold, tinker 
with, or break down status quo relations. The ideological representations of 
Windham Centre residents are inescapably inscribed within the socio-historical 
formation of the Canadian state and settler colonial project of nation building.22 
19. See Miles & Brown, supra note 16, ch 1.
20. Ibid at 87. The wider claim in which the remaining analysis is wrapped is that capitalist 
relations generally and unfree relations of production specifically are fraught with racialized 
and racist representations and contextual practices and relations. In pointing this out, I 
attempt to gain analytical coherence by premising my argument on an analytical distinction 
between racist cognition and exclusionary practice and context and then by accepting that on 
balance these demonstrably develop together. In doing so, I am not rejecting universal claims 
of settler colonialism but instead putting an emphasis on context understood in specific 
historically materialist terms.
21. Terry Eagleton, Ideology: An Introduction (London: Verso, 1991) at 40. See also Slavoj Žižek, 
The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, 1989) at 36 [emphasis in original] (“belief, 
far from being an ‘intimate’, purely mental state, is always materialized in our effective social 
activity”). For an application of ideology critique to law, see Susan Marks, “Big Brother is 
Bleeping Us—With the Message that Ideology Doesn’t Matter” (2001) 12:1 EJIL 109.
22. See e.g. Abigail B Bakan, “Reconsidering the Underground Railroad: Slavery and 
Racialization in the Making of the Canadian State” (2008) 4:1 Socialist Stud 3; Todd 
Gordon, “Towards an Anti-Racist Marxist State Theory: A Canadian Case Study” (2007) 91 
Capital & Class 1; Himani Bannerji, The Dark Side of the Nation: Essays on Multiculturalism, 
Nationalism and Gender (Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press, 2000); Sunera Thobani, Exalted 
Subjects: Studies in the Making of Race and Nation in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2007); Nandita Sharma, Home Economics: Nationalism and the Making of ‘Migrant 
Workers’ in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006). But even if the focus were 
set more narrowly, to capture the very specific or more immediate historical context in which 
the SAWP developed, the emergence of a liberal “‘open’” points system of immigration and 
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Situated within a general historical pattern of racist exclusion from the 
territory now known as Canada,23 in specific ways the SAWP functions through a 
form of differential inclusion or incorporation.24 How one situates the self in the 
evaluation is a crucial if unacknowledged point. Typically, the inclusion-exclusion 
distinction is understood in terms of a self-defining process of Othering from the 
standpoint of the dominant self.25 It is on this basis that racism proves effective 
at “mak[ing] sense of the world and provid[ing] a strategy for political action”26 
through its capacity to address and deflect “conditions, contradictions and 
problems”27 of capitalism. And while racism often marks an attempt to address 
“the concrete problems” of a given social group, Frantz Fanon, among other 
anti-racist thinkers, invites us to take seriously the standpoint of the colonial, 
official multiculturalism, ignoring Canada’s white settler colonial formation, the program 
contains, as argued below, an intricate mix of exclusionary and inclusionary practices. Put 
differently, the challenge of contextualization remains one of setting the level of abstraction 
with the aim of not losing sight of the forest for the trees. The complexity of this is that 
inclusion and exclusion, even when viewed in the short run, are different sides of the same 
coin or “refer to different moments in a single act or process: to include is simultaneously to 
exclude, and vice versa” (see Miles & Brown, supra note 16 at 103). But this understanding 
speaks to the inclusion of one group of people and the exclusion of another distinct group 
such as generally occurs through the existence of immigration law practices of national states. 
Temporary labour migration appears unique in that the same groups of people, migrant 
workers, face at different moments inclusion and exclusion at the hands of the receiving state. 
Sending states play crucial roles in the organization of this inclusion-exclusion.   
23. For an account of the racialized and gendered exclusionary history of citizenship in Canada 
and generally, see Donna Baines & Nandita Sharma, “Migrant Workers as Non-Citizens: The 
Case against Citizenship as a Social Policy Concept” (2002) 69 Stud Pol Econ 75. Canada 
of course was—and is—forged through containment and dispossession of Indigenous 
populations and lands. For an account of this in relation to citizenship, see Darlene Johnston, 
“First Nations and Canadian Citizenship” in William Kaplan, ed, Belonging: The Meaning 
and Future of Canadian Citizenship (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1993) 349.
24. Sharma, supra note 22; Vic Satzewich, Racism and the Incorporation of Foreign Labour: Farm 
Labour Migration to Canada since 1945 (London: Routledge, 2001) [Satzewich, Racism].
25. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1963) 
[Fanon, The Wretched].
26. Miles & Brown, supra note 16 at 107.
27. Stuart Hall, “Racism and Reaction” in Five Views of Multi-Racial Britain: Talks on race 
relations broadcast by BBC TV, 2nd ed (London: Commission for Racial Equality, 1978) 23 
at 35, cited in Miles & Brown, supra note 16 at 107. Whereas Miles and Brown suggest that 
racism depends upon mistaken beliefs, Stuart Hall argues that it “is not a set of mistaken 
perceptions... [It arises] because of the concrete problems of different classes and groups 
in the society. Racism represents the attempt ideologically to construct those conditions, 
contradictions and problems in such a way that they can be dealt with and deflected in the 
same moment” (ibid at 35). 
(2015) 52 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL872
racialized Other.28 In this, the evaluative judgment of the content of residents’ 
written submissions against the bunk house proposal must take place within the 
context of the relations of capitalist agricultural production. 
A. “UNFREE”-ING MIGRANT FARM WORKERS 
Within capitalist societies, ordinary people are more or less compelled to seek 
paid work.29 That compulsion, in theoretical terms, generally occurs through 
economic means. The vast majority of people must earn income to subsist, so 
securing paid work is a necessity. This dull economic compulsion characterizes 
“free” wage labour. For certain workers, however, compulsion takes on an added 
dimension. In contrast to free labour, capitalist societies also contain “unfree 
labour,” defined by the imposition of political and legal compulsion sometimes 
coupled with the use of direct physical force.30 Where unfree labour exists, 
28. The Wretched, supra note 25. Following Miles and Brown, racialization “refers to a process of 
categorization, a representational process of defining the Other” or “a dialectical process of 
signification.” See Miles & Brown, supra note 16 at 101. The concept characterizes attempts 
to “[a]scrib[e] real or imagined biological characteristics with meaning” typically in somatic 
terms (ibid). Its dialectical nature derives from the counterposing of self and other: “[T]o 
define the Other necessarily entails defining Self by the same criteria” (ibid).
29. The phrase “more or less” is a deliberate qualification. This is because, despite the pressures 
or compulsion faced by workers, capitalist production cannot meet the subsistence needs of 
all people within it. Yet the ever-expanding or globalizing logic resulting from the process of 
capital accumulation creates countervailing tendencies: “[A] tendency of capital to increase 
the labouring population, as well as constantly to posit a part of it as surplus population.” 
See Karl Marx, Grundrisse, translated by Martin Nicolaus (London: Penguin, 1973) at 
399 [Marx, Grundrisse], cited in Satzewich, Racism, supra note 24 at 5. The formation of 
this surplus population, or what Marx called a reserve army of labour, facilitates capital 
accumulation just as it undermines that same reserve army which, as Marx so rightly put 
it, “always stands with one foot already in the swamp of pauperism.” See Karl Marx, Das 
Kapital (Washington: Regnery, 2009) at 283. To the extent that migration provides an 
alternative, the modes through which migrant workers are incorporated into social relations 
of production in the receiving state becomes the focus of attention. See Satzewich, Racism, 
supra note 24; Vic Satzewich, “Unfree Labour and Canadian Capitalism: The Incorporation 
of Polish War Veterans” (1989) 28 Stud Pol Econ 89 [Satzewich, “Unfree Labour”]. See also 
H Clare Pentland, Labour and Capital in Canada: 1650-1860, ed by Paul Phillips (Toronto: 
James Lorimer, 1981).
30. See e.g. Miles, supra note 18. For a different definition, see Tom Brass, Towards a Comparative 
Political Economy of Unfree Labour: Case Studies and Debates (London: Frank Cass, 1999); 
Tom Brass & Marcel van der Linden, eds, Free and Unfree Labour: The Debate Continues 
(Bern: Peter Lang, 1997). On the application of unfree labour to migrant agricultural 
workers in Canada, see Satzewich, Racism, supra note 24. See also Tanya Basok, Tortillas and 
Tomatoes: Transmigrant Mexican Harvesters in Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 2002) [Basok, Mexican Harvesters].
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therefore, compulsion occurs through economic, politico-legal, and physical 
means, capturing the use of a range of coercive practices.
Notwithstanding the apparent binary distinction between “free” and 
“unfree,” including the implicit treatment of these as opposites, socio-legal 
historians and theorists have warned against such a simplistic understanding.31 
It is best, then, to see the free-unfree relationship as fitting along an intricate 
and nuanced continuum of coercion.32 In this respect, for instance, we could 
locate as points along a continuum new world enslavement of primarily West 
African peoples as well as the indentured servitude of mostly Chinese and Indian 
labourers following the formal abolition of slavery in the British empire. Following 
this crucial insight, references to certain forms of temporary labour migration as 
enslavement or “slave-like,” or as a form of indentureship, are prescient.33 So 
too are characterizations of free labour as, in Freidrich Engels’s and later in Karl 
Marx’s words,34 wage slavery, although not as synonymous or indistinguishable 
but as kindred.35
Sociologist Vic Satzewich’s account of the political economy of migration 
addresses the incorporation of foreign labour into agricultural production 
relations in Southwestern Ontario.36  On numerous occasions during the twentieth 
31. For the perspective of social historians, see Douglas Hay & Paul Craven, “Introduction” 
in Douglas Hay & Paul Craven, eds, Masters, Servants, and Magistrates in Britain and the 
Empire, 1562-1955 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2004) 1. For the 
perspective of a socio-legal theorist, see Alan Hunt, Explorations in Law and Society: Toward a 
Constitutive Theory of Law (New York: Routledge, 1993) at 64 [Hunt, Law and Society].
32. See e.g. Hay & Craven, supra note 31 at 27.
33. This is a charge consistently levelled by workers and organizers alike—for instance, by 
Justicia For Migrant Workers—and by researchers as well. See e.g. El Contrato, 2003, 
DVD (Montreal: National Film Board of Canada, 2003 (Min Sook Lee’s award-winning 
documentary). See also Eugenie Depatie-Pelletier, “Under Legal Practices Similar to 
Slavery According to the UN Convention: Canada’s ‘Non White’ ‘Temporary’ Foreign 
Workers in ‘Low-Skilled’ Occupations,” (Paper delivered at the 10th National Metropolis 
Conference, Halifax, 5 April 2008) at 15-19, online: <archives.cerium.ca/IMG/pdf/
Article_Depatie-Pelletier_Metropolis_2008.pdf>.
34. Marx, Grundrisse, supra note 30 at 36; Karl Marx, Wage-Labour and Capital, translated by JL 
Joynes (London: Twentieth Century Press, 1893) at 3.
35. Friedrich Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in England, translated by WO 
Henderson and WH Chaloner (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958) at 92-94. 
36. Racism, supra note 24.
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century, the Canadian state sought to mobilize both internal37 and external38 
labour reserves to undertake agricultural work. Free immigrant labour, unfree 
immigrant labour, free migrant labour, and unfree migrant labour formed the 
four available modes of incorporation of foreign-born labour in the post-World 
War II period.39  Following many failed attempts, and under ongoing pressure 
from several sources since the late 1940s,40 the Canadian state ultimately opted 
to formalize the mobilization of external labour reserves through the creation 
of the SAWP. In 1966, workers from Jamaica were incorporated as unfree 
migrant labour, and in subsequent years and decades, the SAWP expanded to 
include people from other parts of the Caribbean and Mexico.41 The differential 
incorporation of these workers, as Satzewich makes clear, has been structured 
through processes of racialization and racism.42
Under the SAWP, migrant workers are deployed in Canadian agricultural 
production for anywhere from several weeks to upwards of eight months in a 
37. During World War II, the Canadian state sought to mobilize “unfree wage labour,” including 
German prisoners of war, Japanese internees, and conscientious objectors (especially people 
of Doukhobor and Mennonite faith). See Satzewich, Racism, supra note 24 at 73-76. In 
addition to efforts to mobilize urban and rural unemployed workers in the two decades 
following the war, the state endeavoured to draw from such sources of labour as ten- to 
sixteen-year-old children (with the assistance of the YWCA and YMCA), Indigenous peoples, 
mental health patients, military personnel, and high school students (ibid at 69, 77-81).  
38. The use of “external” pools of labour included Polish war veterans and Displaced Persons (as 
unfree immigrant labour), Dutch farmers (as free immigrant labour), and Western European 
university students, tobacco workers from the southern United States, and Caribbean 
workers (as unfree migrant labour). See Satzewich, Racism, ibid, ch 4. See also Satzewich, 
“Unfree Labour,” supra note 26.
39. See Satzewich, Racism, supra note 24, ch 4. Although Satzewich identifies these four forms, 
his analysis indicates that all but free migrant labour were deployed in the twentieth-century 
Canadian context.
40. Ibid. Political pressure derived from three sources: growers in Canada, Caribbean state 
officials, and British officials on behalf of Caribbean states.
41. See also Irving André, “The Genesis and Persistence of the Commonwealth Caribbean 
Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program in Canada” (1990) 28:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 243 
at 256-57; Basok, Mexican Harvesters, supra note 30 at 18; Vic Satzewich, “Business or 
Bureaucratic Dominance in Immigration Policymaking in Canada: Why was Mexico 
Included in the Caribbean Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program in 1974?” (2007) 8:3 Int’l 
Migr & Int 255 at 256.
42. Satzewich, Racism, supra note 24 at 46 (“the process of racialization plays a key role in the 
state’s determination of the permiability of the boundaries of the nation state, and in the 
allocation and incorporation of foreign-born persons to positions in the division of labour”).
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year.43 SAWP workers are tied exclusively to a specific agricultural employer 
within a defined geographic locale. Bound in this way, workers are not permitted 
to circulate freely in the labour market and must return home at the end of their 
work authorization or at any other moment determined by their employers. In 
other words, workers experience severely circumscribed labour and geographic 
mobility within Canada. They are permitted to remain in the country only for 
the duration of their contract and, on the prerogative of growers, can be forced 
to leave sooner. During their authorized period of stay, migrant farm workers 
may not alter the conditions of their authorization, change occupations, or take 
on additional employment without the written approval of a federal immigration 
official and a transfer contract approved by a representative of their home 
government and the prospective employer.44 Thus, while the use of migrant 
workers in the SAWP is organized around economic compulsion generally, 
migratory status is a core means of labour unfreedom. The pivotal instrument—
the temporary work permit or authorization—subjects non-citizens to the 
constant threat of deportation.
The politico-legal regulation of migrant labour can be further conceptualized 
through what I term the dynamic of “mobilize to immobilize,”45 which captures 
the transnational regulatory contours. In other words, SAWP workers are 
mobilized to cross territorial borders only to be immobilized within Canada. 
The workers who make the annual trek to Canadian fields and greenhouses 
to harvest crops are governed by the regulatory dynamics of mobilization and 
immobilization that frame the specific relations and conditions of unfreedom 
in which they find themselves. The immobilization, which occurs in a number 
of political and legal respects, is primarily organized around the core SAWP 
43. Employment and Social Development Canada, “Labour Market Opinion Statistics – Annual 
Statistics” (28 January 2014) at n 4, online: <www.esdc.gc.ca/eng/jobs/foreign_workers/
lmo_statistics/annual-agriculture.shtml>. In 2012, 18,500 of the total 29,025 positions 
available in Canada were located in Ontario (ibid).
44. There is ample evidence that existing (or former) employers have a hand in the denial of 
worker transfer requests.  The prerogative power of growers to repatriate workers amounts 
to an extension, expansion, and privatization of the Canadian state’s deportation authority. 
Ultimately, the operation of immigration law undermines existing (and prospective) labour 
rights and protections.
45. An illustration of this dynamic is found in the work of Prabhu Mohapatra. See Prabhu P 
Mohapatra, “Assam and the West Indies, 1860-1920: Immobilizing Plantation Labour” in 
Hay & Craven, eds, supra note 31, 455.
(2015) 52 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL876
agreements—country-to-country agreements and the contract of employment46—
as well as immigration law and labour and employment law. The work permit is 
instrumental in worker immobilization.47 Thus, the Canadian state assumes a 
role of crucial importance in facilitating labour unfreedom and the transnational 
mobilization-immobilization regulatory dynamic.48
Agricultural employers recruit, exact, and retain the labour power of workers 
through the use of economic coercion and through the additional use of work 
permits and deportation, which serve to intensify the process of exploitation 
and immobilization, shrouding it in the protective seal of law’s violence. In this 
46. The current annual contract is available through the Employment and Social Development 
Canada website. See Employment and Social Development Canada, “Hiring Seasonal 
Agricultural Workers” (25 June 2015), online: <www.esdc.gc.ca/eng/jobs/foreign_workers/
agriculture/seasonal//index.shtml>. For detailed—if somewhat dated—looks at the SAWP 
worker contracts, see André, supra note 41; Veena Verma, “The Mexican and Caribbean 
Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program: Regulatory and Policy Framework, Farm Industry 
Level Employment Practices, and the Future of the Program under Unionization” 
(1 December 2003), online: <oppenheimer.mcgill.ca/IMG/pdf/csawp_verma_final_
report-1.pdf>. 
47. For an analysis of the use of work permits to enforce differential inclusion, see Sharma, 
supra note 22. Luin Goldring, Carolina Berinstein, and Judith Bernhard develop the idea 
of “precarious [migrant] status”—borrowing from the precarious employment context and 
from earlier work on the Live-In Caregiver Program—to capture variations in status for new 
immigrant, temporary migrant, and undocumented workers. See Luin Goldring, Carolina 
Berinstein & Judith K Bernhard, “Institutionalizing Precarious Migratory Status In Canada” 
(2009) 13:3 Citizenship Stud 239 at 245. In their words, “precarious migratory status, like 
citizenship, is multi-dimensional and constructed by specific state policies, regulations, 
practices of policy implementation, activism, discourses, and so forth” (ibid at 240).
48. That said, I do not mean to downplay the “heavy lifting” performed through sending state 
apparatuses. It is instead to accept that, because the SAWP rests upon the hierarchies of 
the national state system and uneven capitalist development, the imperialist project of the 
Canadian state ultimately structures relations within the SAWP.  From this perspective, any 
serious analysis must hold the role of the Canadian state to account. For the best point of 
departure on the role of the Canadian state in temporary labour migration, see Satzewich, 
Racism, supra note 24. For a forceful and lucid intervention on contemporary imperialism of 
the Canadian state, see Todd Gordon, Imperialist Canada (Winnipeg: Arbeiter Ring, 2010) 
[Gordon, Imperialist Canada].
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respect, the SAWP is not merely exploitative—it is super- or hyper-exploitative.49 
We can express this proposition in any—or perhaps all—of three ways. First, by 
virtue of the added dimension of coercion, more surplus can be taken or exacted 
from migrant workers than from free wage labour. Second, migrant workers face 
both economic exploitation and extra-economic coercion in the ways they are 
recruited and retained within the labour market. A third manner of expressing 
labour unfreedom turns on the use of mechanisms of control not merely over the 
deployment of labour power but in fact over migrant workers themselves. In this 
connection, it is evident that the work and wider social lives of these workers are 
governed by the dictates of labour unfreedom. The analysis below builds on this 
third expression of the hyper-exploitative nature of the SAWP. 
B. HOUSING MIGRANT LABOUR 
A key requirement under the SAWP employment contract is that growers must 
provide free housing accommodations for workers.50 In fact, the provision of 
“adequate housing” has served as a point of contention under the SAWP. Workers 
have complained publicly about “work-camp,” “ghetto,” or “slum” living 
conditions, typically in trailers located on growers’ farms. More specifically, the 
list of concerns include crammed bunk houses and overcrowded living areas, 
mould in bedrooms, sewage smells, rodents, gas leaks, leaky roofs, and a lack of 
49. Marxist thinkers, such as geographer David Harvey, use the term “super-exploitation,” for 
instance, to capture how capitalism’s ongoing creation of a surplus population, a reserve 
army of labour, intensifies labour exploitation. See e.g. David Harvey, A Companion to Marx’s 
Capital (London: Verso, 2010) at 145. Somewhat indiscriminately, Harvey deploys the term 
as an intensifier on Marx’s foundational idea of labour exploitation (and Harvey even uses it 
to refer to land exploitation). In contrast, I find value in narrowing and specifying the term’s 
usage. As this article argues, the intensification of economic compulsion through forms of 
immobilization produces a qualitatively distinct from of labour exploitation—unfreedom—
which, in line with the heightened emphasis on time-space compression in contemporary 
social theory, I prefer to characterize as hyper-exploitation. The proliferation of temporary 
labour migration-infused economic activities works to annihilate spatial barriers. On 
time-space compression, see David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into 
the Origins of Cultural Change (Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell, 1990), ch 15.
50. Employment and Social Development Canada, “Agreement for the Employment in Canada 
of Seasonal Agricultural Workers from Mexico – 2013” (16 May 2013) at para II(1), online: 
<www.esdc.gc.ca/eng/jobs/foreign_workers/agriculture/seasonal/sawpmc2013.pdf>.
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indoor toilets.51 Fires present an additional hazard.52 As well, the close proximity 
of worker accommodations to farm operations has led to serious health and 
safety concerns, specifically chronic exposures to pesticides.53 Finally, employer 
surveillance of worker housing through electronic or visual means is also an 
ongoing concern. Therefore, the provision of housing appears to contribute to 
the immobilization of these workers. 
A troubling consequence of all of this is that migrant workers toil and dwell 
in deep social isolation while in Canada.54 This isolation serves growers’ demands 
for lengthy hours of work especially during peak harvest and, in trampling on 
any possibility for sustained leisure time, further exacerbates worker isolation. 
51. Vidya Kauri, “Canada Migrant Workers Prone To Abuse, Exploitation Due To Lax 
Government Oversight: Advocates,” The Huffington Post (21 January 2012), online: <www.
huffingtonpost.ca/2012/01/21/canada-migrant-workers-abuse_n_1210725.html>; “Mexican 
farm workers complain about conditions,” The Globe and Mail (21 May 2001), online: 
<www.theglobeandmail.com/incoming/mexican-farm-workers-complain-about-conditions/
article1182607>; Amanda Truscott, “Foreign workers decry ‘harsh’ dismissals from farms,” 
The Globe and Mail (12 December 2008), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/news/
national/foreign-workers-decry-harsh-dismissals-from-farms/article664850>; Tony Van 
Alphen, “Employers are abusing farm workers, unions charge,” Toronto Star (27 October 
1994) A12; Kerry Preibisch & Jenna Hennebry, “Temporary Migration, Chronic Effects: 
The Health of International Migrant Workers in Canada” (2011) 183:9 Can Med Assoc J 
1033 at 1036. For the British Columbia context, see Justicia for Migrant Workers, “Housing 
Conditions for Temporary Migrant Agricultural Workers in B.C.” (October 2007), online: 
<www.justicia4migrantworkers.org/bc/pdf/Housing%20Report%20-%20Oct%2007.pdf>; 
Sustainable Agriculture Management Branch, Regulating Temporary Farm Worker Housing In 
the ALR: Discussion Paper and Standards (March 2009), online: British Columbia Ministry of 
Agriculture and Lands <www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/farming-natural-resources-and-industry/
agriculture-and-seafood/agricultural-land-and-environment/strengthening-farming/800-
series/800221-1_temp_farm_worker_housing_mar09.pdf>; Patricia Tomic, Ricardo Trumper 
& Luis LM Aguiar, “Housing Regulations and Living Conditions of Mexican Migrant 
Workers in the Okanagan Valley, B.C.” (Spring 2010) Can Issues 78; Anonymous, “Improve 
Housing: Consulate” (2012) 28:8 Occupational Health & Safety Can 6.
52. Sarah Doktor, “Faulty water heater likely cause of blaze,” Simcoe Reformer (17 June 2013), 
online: <www.simcoereformer.ca/2013/06/17/faulty-water-heater-likely-cause-of-blaze>; 
Ashley House, “Farm bunkhouse burns down,” Times-Reformer (14 October 2008), online: 
<www.simcoereformer.ca/2008/10/14/farm-bunkhouse-burns-down>.
53. For a recent look at the impacts of pesticide drift in California through an environmental 
justice lens, see Jill Lindsey Harrison, Pesticide Drift and the Pursuit of Environmental Justice 
(Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 2011).
54. The argument in this paragraph draws from three sources: my ongoing personal observation 
of migrant workers in Southwestern Ontario since the early 2000s, my ongoing personal 
communications with migrant workers over the same period, and the experiences of 
organizers in Justicia for Migrant Workers. See e.g. Adrian A Smith “Legal Consciousness and 
Resistance in Caribbean Seasonal Agricultural Workers” (2005) 20:2 CJLS 95.
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Yet another contributing factor is the spatial dispersal of workers on farms that 
are often far apart and typically house only a smattering of workers each. Already 
separated from family and community back home, workers live among each 
other often in tight quarters. Add to this the splintering of workers across the vast 
geographic expanse of rural southern Ontario (or other provinces, for that matter). 
The mandatory housing provision on or near the farm, therefore, produces an 
enforced physical separation and social isolation of migrant agricultural workers 
from each other and from local community residents. 
The sustained isolation coupled with the relatively close proximity to 
employers has several disturbing consequences. For one, the worker-employer 
relationship is characterized as paternalistic.55 The structural features of the 
SAWP also are said to foster the need for workers, especially women, to impress 
their bosses with high productivity.56 In another respect, troubling social and 
economic consequences emerge out of popular cultural representations of 
migrant agricultural workers. Cultural geographer Harald Bauder has shown 
how discursive representations in mainstream newsprint media in rural Ontario 
legitimate unfree migrant labour.57 These representations, according to Bauder, 
create social conditions ripe for the discriminatory treatment of migrant workers 
on farms and within rural communities. In striving to extend this insight to the 
impact of the proposed housing by-law amendment, I turn to the socio-legal 
concept of legal consciousness to evaluate the written opposition to the 
proposed bunk house. 
55. For instance, Tanya Basok contends that “Mexicans assigned to individual growers often 
develop a paternalistic relationship with their employers. As a result, most of the workers 
feel loyal to their patrones (employers) and do not wish to abandon them.” See Tanya 
Basok, “He Came, He Saw, He … Stayed. Guest Worker Programmes and the Issue of 
Non-Return” (2000) 38:2 Int’l Migr 215 at 217 [emphasis in original] [Basok, “Guest 
Worker Programmes”]. 
56. Janet McLaughlin, “Classifying the ‘Ideal Migrant Worker’: Mexican and Jamaican 
Transnational Farmworkers in Canada” (2010) 57 Focaal J Global & Hist Anthropology 
79 at 84; Kerry L Preibisch & Evelyn Encalada Grez, “The Other Side of el Otro Lado: 
Mexican Migrant Women and Labor Flexibility in Canadian Agriculture” (2010) 35:2 Signs 
289. See also Basok, “Guest Worker Programmes,” supra note 55 at 217 (suggesting that 
“[g]rowers’ compliance with requirements for minimum working and living standards assures 
workers’ loyalty”).
57. “Landscape and Scale in Media Representations: The Construction of Offshore Farm Labour 
in Ontario, Canada” (2005) 12:1 Cult Geographies 41 at 43.
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II. A RECONSTITUTED APPROACH TO LEGAL 
CONSCIOUSNESS
The deployment of legal consciousness as an analytical tool for articulating how 
ordinary peoples’ understandings of law shape expectations and behaviour hinges 
on the assumption that Windham Centre community members are advancing a 
particular set of legal consciousness claims. These claims not only are informed 
by consciousness about the relations and conditions of the SAWP but in fact 
inform actions and enforce material practices. As a preliminary task, I sketch 
the basis of a reconstituted approach that I term a “materialist approach” to 
legal consciousness.
The study of legal consciousness has developed in a number of disparate 
strands.58 As a useful point of departure, a basic distinction can be drawn in terms 
of two unique analytical orientations. The first category of studies emphasizes the 
understandings and actions of legal insiders including lawyers, judges, and other 
adjudicators. The second set of studies focuses on the understandings of a host of 
outsiders or “ordinary people.”59 The insider-outsider distinction is forged on the 
characterization of insiders as “official” producers and purveyors of knowledge 
in law whereas outsiders are deemed “unofficial” sources.60 Although admittedly 
58. For a critical—albeit American-centric—recounting of law and society or socio-legal 
approaches to legal consciousness, see Susan S Silbey, “After Legal Consciousness” (2005) 1 
Ann Rev L & Soc Sci 323 [Silbey, “After Legal Consciousness”]. For the contrasting accounts 
of legal consciousness from within the critical legal studies movement, see especially Karl 
E Klare, “Contracts Jurisprudence and the First-Year Casebook,” Book Review of Problems 
in Contract Law: Cases and Materials by Charles L Knapp, (1979) 54:4 NYU L Rev 876 at 
876-77, n 2; Karl E Klare, “Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of 
Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941” (1978) 62:3 Minn L Rev 265; Duncan Kennedy, 
“Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal 
Thought in America, 1850-1940” in Susan S Silbey, Steven Spitzer & Austin Sarat, eds, 
Research in Law and Sociology: A Research Annual, vol 3 (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1980) 
3. For situating these latter texts within a historical and theoretical context, see Robert W 
Gordon, “Critical Legal Histories” (1984) 36:1&2 Stan L Rev 57 [Gordon, “Critical Legal 
Histories”]; Robert W Gordon, “‘Critical Legal Histories Revisited’: A Response” (2012) 
37:1 Law & Soc Inquiry 200 [Gordon, “Revisited”].
59. See generally Lesley A Jacobs, “Legal Consciousness and Its Significance for Law and Society 
Teaching Outside Canadian Law Schools” (2003) 18:1 CJLS 61 at 63.
60. For a socio-legal treatment of “official” and “unofficial” versions of law, see Elizabeth 
Comack, “Theoretical Excursions” in Elizabeth Comack, ed, Locating Law: Race/Class/
Gender/Sexuality Connections, 2nd ed (Halifax: Fernwood, 2006) 19 at 20-24. In her analysis, 
Comack cites Ngaire Naffine. See Ngaire Naffine, Law and the Sexes: Explorations in Feminist 
Jurisprudence (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1990) at 24-26, 48, 51-52.
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quite simplified,61 the distinction helps to situate the orientation and emphasis 
of the analytical framework developed herein, as it fits within the latter category.
What precisely is meant by legal consciousness? What aspect of social life 
does it apprehend or highlight?62 According to new legal consciousness studies,63 
ordinary people seek through a variety of means to understand, make sense of, 
and engage in the social context and activities in which they are situated. Of 
particular interest is the way understandings of, or consciousness about, law 
inform claims making and, in turn, the impacts of this consciousness on existing 
relations and conditions. Reliant upon a constitutive theory of social action,64 
new legal consciousness studies view “legal consciousness as participation in the 
61. I concede that this is an overly rigid distinction and a rather simplified categorization of 
competing conceptions of legal consciousness, but it is not one on which the core argument 
is meant to turn. Nor is the distinction meant to do much more than clarify the starting 
focus of my particular take on the study of legal consciousness. Thus, while recognizing the 
salience of the view that legal knowledge is power, the study of legal consciousness is from 
this perspective meant to deeply complicate legal knowledge assertions. To say that mine is 
focused on an outsider’s legal consciousness is not to suggest that all outsiders are created 
equal. Issues of positionality, situatedness, and relativity are of crucial importance, although 
not taken up in the core analysis. An implicit analytical assumption is that the socio-legal 
location of rural citizen homeowners, although typically outside the legal regime, is closer 
to the core or inside than that of migrant workers. Nevertheless, attentiveness to the relative 
positioning of subjects does not preclude a universal claim about the marginalized location of 
those categorized as “outsiders.”
62. Trevor Purvis & Alan Hunt, “Discourse, Ideology, Discourse, Ideology, Discourse, 
Ideology…” (1993) 44:3 Brit J Soc 473 at 474. My turn to “legal consciousness” is based 
on a desire to bring some structure as well as a conceptual and qualitatively-derived 
understanding to how processes of cognition and action work in relation to law. Legal 
consciousness is meant not as a total analysis or claim but as a conceptual tool aiming to 
highlight the existence of a link, albeit a complex one, between structure and agency and 
as a descriptive aggregator of sorts utilized to convey the common assumptions of a given 
group of people. 
63. See e.g. Patricia Ewick & Susan S Silbey, The Common Place of Law: Stories from Everyday 
Life (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998); Patricia Ewick, “Consciousness and 
Ideology” in Austin Sarat, ed, The Blackwell Companion to Law and Society (Malden, Mass: 
Blackwell, 2004) 80; Laura Beth Nielsen, “Situating Legal Consciousness: Experiences and 
Attitudes of Ordinary Citizens about Law and Street Harassment” (2000) 34:4 Law & Soc’y 
Rev 1055. See also Silbey, “After Legal Consciousness,” supra note 58.
64. Scholars such as Robert Gordon and Alan Hunt—and in a certain respect EP Thompson 
before them—have encouraged the development of a constitutive theory of law while 
warning against an overly broad and general construction that would render it virtually 
unhelpful if not meaningless. See Hunt, Law and Society, supra note 30; Gordon, “Critical 
Legal Histories,” supra note 58; Gordon, “Revisited,” supra note 58.
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processes of social construction.”65 In this way, consciousness forms part of “a 
reciprocal process in which the meanings given by individuals to their world 
become patterned, stabilized and objectified.”66 That said, it transcends the 
“individual” and “ideational,” representing instead “a type of social practice, in 
the sense that it both reflects and forms social structures.”67 Legal consciousness 
therefore “cannot be understood independently of its role in the collective 
construction of legality,”68 including its maintenance and enforcement.
A key dimension of legal consciousness analysis is that cognitive 
understandings translate into action. “The study of legal consciousness,” according 
to Susan Silbey’s critical account, “is the search for the forms of participation and 
interpretation through which actors construct, sustain, reproduce, or amend the 
circulating (contested or hegemonic) structures of meanings concerning law.”69 
My aim is to push the study of legal consciousness beyond a reformist policy 
preoccupation to attend to directly corporeal or embodied ways of knowing and 
acting.70 If the study of legal consciousness can be organized around three critical 
elements of analysis—discourse, ideology, and material practices—a materialist 
approach to legal consciousness studies fuses these elements through a reliance on 
65. SS Silbey, “Legal Culture and Legal Consciousness” in Neil J Smelser & Paul B Baltes, eds, 
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (Oxford: Elsevier Science, 2001) 
8623 at 8627 [Silbey, “Legal Culture”].
66. Ibid.
67. Silbey, “After Legal Consciousness,” supra note 58 at 334.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid. “Law is a basic, constitutive attribute of our social consciousness. It is a particular 
way of organizing meaning and force” (ibid at 359). That said, one could push this search 
beyond structures of meanings to encompass acting and deciding in a variety of realms 
including legal-institutional. In this, then, the task is to examine how “what [people] think 
and do coalesces into a recognizable, durable phenomena and institution we recognize as 
the law” (ibid at 347). There are a number of ways to access this. In this article, I describe 
the approach adopted in this analysis. Another approach might link more closely with 
an interrogation of the forms of action (and in this the legal consciousness) encouraged 
in a particular institutional adjudication such as the municipal one. When coupled with, 
for instance, the state administrative apparatus—such as a municipal by-law amendment 
process and hearing—how do understandings of legal consciousness relate to both acts of 
intervention, such as those in which Windham Centre residents engaged, as well as acts 
of adjudication?
70. For the shift in legal consciousness research to a focus on policy reforms, see Silbey, “After 
Legal Consciousness,” ibid.
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anti-racist, historical materialist insights.71 The unity of the whole is the crux on 
which I reconstitute legal consciousness studies. This unity provides a solid basis 
for clarifying the relationship between the core elements of discourse, ideology, 
and action or practice within the analytical concept of legal consciousness. 
Generally put, these elements should be taken together to counter a fragmented 
and dichotomized explanation. Trevor Purvis and Alan Hunt have shown that 
ideology and discourse need not be “counterposed.”72 Countering perceptions 
of an explanatory tension, they forge an explicit connection between ideology 
71. In only sketching out their relationship, however, I admit to developing a stylized account. 
In this vein, I acknowledge the need to further unpack and clarify the interconnections and 
theoretical undercurrents. That said, I also wish to make clear that such an account owes 
its allegiances to anti-racist theory and Marxism. Nor, however, do I claim to advance a 
definitive Marxist account. Rather, I interject a reconstituted legal consciousness account 
informed by an anti-racist Marxist interpretation. An implicit claim of this work, therefore, 
is that anti-racist insights must be brought to bear on the study of legal consciousness, 
which calls for sustained emphasis on the racialized class dimensions of legal consciousness. 
My use of the term “anti-racism” is meant to include anti-colonialism grounded in the 
insights of Fanon—for instance as set out in the epigraph, and CLR James—but, too, 
with an acknowledgement of the masculinist formulation of far too much of what passes 
as anti-colonial thought of the twentieth century. To this end, the interventions of scholars 
like Himani Bannerji prove incisive. See e.g. Himani Bannerji, Thinking Through: Essays on 
Feminism, Marxism, and Anti-Racism (Toronto: Women’s Press, 1995); Himani Bannerji, 
“Building from Marx: Reflections on Class and Race” (2005) 32:4 Soc Just 144. Here, for 
expediency, I collapse anti-colonialism into anti-racism. But I do not wish for this to be taken 
as neglect for recent calls to attend to the decolonization of anti-racism, even though the 
ways in which this should unfold, from my perspective, are properly contested. For this latter 
point, see Bonita Lawrence & Enakshi Dua, “Decolonizing Antiracism” (2005) 32:4 Soc Just 
120; Nandita Sharma & Cynthia Wright, “Decolonizing Resistance, Challenging Colonial 
States” (2008-09) 35:3 Soc Just 120.
72. Supra note 62. As Purvis and Hunt note, contemporary deployment of the concept of 
ideology typically develops within or arises out of Marxism, whereas the concept of discourse 
has tended to be deployed through post-structuralist perspectives (ibid at 474). In arguing 
for a unified approach, the point is not to smooth over the rough edges between these sets 
of theoretical traditions. Indeed, very real and pivotal differences distinguish Marxist and 
so-called post-Marxist accounts. But Marxist theory need not yield the capacity to analyze 
discourse, especially as law’s authority has crucial discursive and wider communicative 
dimensions. That said, law’s effects do not stop at discourse. Fundamentally, material 
violence underwrites discourse as, for instance, “police use their rifle butts to ‘speak the 
language of pure force’ to the wretched of the earth.” See Jeannine Purdy, “Postcolonialism: 
The Emperor’s New Clothes?” (1996) 5:4 Soc & Leg Stud 405 at 420. For the source that 
Purdy quotes, see Fanon, The Wretched, supra note 25 at 38. See also Douglas Hay, “Time, 
Inequality, and Law’s Violence” in Austin Sarat & Thomas R Kearns, eds, Law’s Violence (Ann 
Arbor, Mich: The University of Michigan Press, 1992) 141 [Hay, “Law’s Violence”].
(2015) 52 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL884
and discourse analysis yet also leave room to account for material practice.73 
Taking seriously this invitation, I adopt an approach attentive not merely to 
discourse and ideology, but fundamentally to their relationship with material 
dimensions of law.  
Consciousness about work and social life under capitalism shapes and 
contains consciousness about law. A reconstituted legal consciousness offers an 
analytical framework that organizes the collective understandings and actions 
of ordinary people. The focus is on the material effects of ordinary people’s 
invocations of law to make sense of their everyday lives and to take action in 
the world. These invocations—whether in terms of explicit references to rights, 
property, and legality; to legal definitions, categories, and meanings; or to deeply 
embedded perceptions of law—convey understandings of law’s role in social life. 
But because analysis of discourse alone cannot suffice because it must be further 
contextualized, the task becomes one of appreciating the material practices and 
effects of discourse especially as it relates to ideological representations of relations 
of domination and subordination.  
Armed with the understanding of the unity of the whole, it becomes necessary 
to investigate law’s materiality. Both discourse and ideology address human 
participation in the construction of consciousness of how law shapes existing 
social relations. A crucial task, however, is “to continue to emphasize the directly 
coercive features of a legal regime that distinguish law from other discourses,”74 
for law’s “distinctiveness as discursive practice” rests on a foundation of coercive 
force and violence.75 As a result, neither the discursive nor the ideological 
dimensions of law can be divorced from “law’s real impact on real people and real 
relations.”76 To take seriously material impacts, and in so doing, lived experience, 
a meaningful analysis of ideological discourse must take seriously coercion while 
also avoiding ahistorical, disembodied accounts. Following David McNally, who 
argues “that any attempt to understand language in abstraction from bodies 
and their histories can only produce an impoverished knowledge,”77 “that the 
question of language is a question of the body[, a]nd that all body questions are 
73. Purvis & Hunt, supra note 62.
74. Judy Fudge & Eric Tucker, Labour Before the Law: The Regulation of Workers’ Collective 
Action in Canada, 1900–1948 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001) at 7.
75. Hay, “Law’s Violence,” supra note 72 at 141. See also Purdy, supra note 72.
76. Alan Hunt, “The Ideology of Law: Advances and Problems in Recent Applications of the 
Concept of Ideology to the Analysis of Law” (1985) 19:1 Law & Soc’y Rev 11 at 26.  
77. Bodies of Meaning: Studies on Language, Labor, and Liberation (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 2001) at 10 [McNally, Bodies of Meaning].
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questions of life and work—and the prospects for their liberation,”78 I reunify 
language with bodies and material conditions—conditions that are understood 
historically.79 This “turn to the body,”80 however, is not a mere inversion of “the 
dualism of language and body.”81 It is instead embedded within an “emancipatory 
practice … [which, in] return[ing] the body to language and language to the 
body,”82 confronts the constraining and dehumanizing effects of capitalist social 
relations. “The way labor is organized,” on this account, “becomes central to the 
histories of laboring bodies and their extensions.”83 And through the construction 
of unfree labour, as already discussed, the law and the state assume a pivotal role 
78. Ibid at 14.
79. The privileging of discursive analysis similarly is “abstract and disembodied.” See McNally, 
Bodies of Meaning, ibid at 230. McNally mounts “a sharp critique of the tendency of major 
social theorists to abstract language from human bodies and their social practices” (ibid at 1). 
Material feminist theorizing of the body also provides an incisive intervention. See e.g. Stacy 
Alaimo & Susan Hekman, eds, Material Feminisms (Bloomington, Ind: Indiana University 
Press, 2008). While I am reluctant to term it “historical materialist,” the approach articulated 
here marks an initial attempt to move in such a direction. In future work, I hope to develop 
more fully a historical materialist approach to the study of legal consciousness.
80. McNally, Bodies of Meaning, supra note 77 at 230 [emphasis omitted].
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid at 8. McNally goes on to suggest that:
The human body … is inherently historical. True, bodies have a relatively fixed biological 
constitution. But the evolutionary history of the human body also involves the emergence of 
cultural practices and social history. To talk meaningfully about the human body is to talk about 
bodies that are the site of dynamic social processes, bodies that generate open-ended systems of 
meaning. It is, in other words, to talk about relations of production and reproduction, about 
languages, images of desire, technologies, and diverse forms of sociocultural organization. All 
of these things operate on the site of the body and its history. This is not to say they create the 
body. It is to insist, however, that they extend and modify bodily existence and experience. 
The constants of bodily existence take shape through manifold and pliable forms of social life. 
This is what it means to describe the human body as an indeterminate constancy; and it’s what 
it means to talk … about historical bodies. For historical bodies are … both linguistic and 
laboring ones (ibid at 7).
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in the organization and regulation of labour migration and racialized migrant 
labouring bodies.84
III. LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF WINDHAM CENTRE 
RESIDENTS
The primary focus of my examination of the written reactions of Windham Centre 
residents to the by-law amendment application rests on the legal consciousness 
of respondents.85 The task is to view the written responses through the lens 
of legal consciousness so as to categorize and evaluate them, with particular 
attention placed on ascertaining what outcomes are produced. I undertook a 
84. An important insight is that capitalist labour organization forms a centerpiece of the 
historical construction of labouring bodies. We must also account for the racialized class 
dimensions of these processes. Quite crucially, class is experienced through processes of 
racialization, and so there is a need to appreciate the racialized nature of labouring bodies not 
as some sort of historical accident or coincidence but as a pivotal feature of the continuing 
development of capitalism. A requirement is recognition of the racialized and racist ways 
in which capitalist social relations have unfolded. For instance, feminist geographers such 
as Alison Mountz and Geraldine Pratt attend to the racialized and gendered practices of 
the state in the context of the lived embodied experiences of migrant workers. See Alison 
Mountz, “Embodying the nation-state: Canada’s response to human smuggling” (2004) 
23:3 Political Geography 323; Geraldine Pratt & Philippine Women Centre, “Inscribing 
Domestic Work on Filipina Bodies” in Heidi J Nast & Steve Pile, eds, Places Through the 
Body (London: Routledge, 1998) 211.
85. The limitations of a textual analysis emerge here, including the display of elements of social 
censure but also the need for further contextualization. Further contextualization of the 
written submissions through qualitative interviews of residents may help to shed light on 
certain claims advanced within the submissions. An important query that needs further 
attention is: on what basis do the objections of residents rest and are the objections based 
on past observation of migrant workers, implicit interpretations of the SAWP, explicit 
interpretations of the supposed “bunkhouse” provisions in the City Plan, a mixture of 
these, or perhaps another set of considerations altogether?  Moreover, a range of advocacy 
techniques were deployed, which, although forming an intriguing set of arguments and 
narrative worthy of deeper reflection, I largely ignore. Only a small set of responses expressed 
ambivalence on what decision should be reached, although even these pointed to negative 
features of the existence of workers in the community. A common refrain among respondents 
was that the entire community opposed the proposal. A review of the newsprint media 
stories at the time does not support or undermine that claim. In another respect, it might be 
useful to evaluate these written responses in terms of the forms of argumentation in which 
residents’ justifications are set. As such, one could undertake a critical analysis of the land use 
planning regime as a site of legal argument production. On argumentation, see Frans H van 
Eemeren, Sally Jackson & Scott Jacobs, “Argumentation” in van Dijk, ed, Discourse Studies: A 
Multidisciplinary Introduction, 2nd ed (London: Sage, 2011) 85. 
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process of coding using a three-pass procedure in which I reviewed the written 
submissions first to gain general familiarity, again to identify common themes 
and trends, and a final time to categorize identified trends.86 I concerned myself 
not with a clause-by-clause dissection of the textual responses but, through the 
categorization of objections, with the broad patterns of responses. These patterns 
reflect assumptions and representations of particular dimensions of the social 
world that articulate a particular form of legal consciousness. In particular, we 
find representations of the Other and Self. I hone in on these representations 
as they relate to the overlapping relationships between migrant workers and 
growers, between migrant workers and residents of Windham Centre, and to a 
lesser extent between growers and residents.
I analyze the objections voiced in the written submissions in two primary 
groups: (1) concerns related to the supervision and monitoring of migrant workers 
and; (2) concerns about personal safety, including fear of sexual harassment, 
physical violence, and associated illicit activities.87 The complexity of responses 
raises questions about whether the concern is with the reconstitution of the school 
86. I supplemented the coding process with a review of local newspaper accounts of the Norfolk 
Potato migrant housing proposal. In addition, I engaged in a series of extensive discussions 
with members of Justicia For Migrant Workers, a Toronto and Vancouver-based activist 
collective that has worked in support of migrant worker justice for now over a decade. Those 
discussions began as the events of the housing proposal unfolded and have continued up 
until the completion of this article. In particular I wish to acknowledge the involvement 
of Chris Ramsaroop and Tzazna Miranda Leal in helping me to formulate my thoughts on 
community responses to the housing proposal.
87. A chief focus of the analysis of the submissions is on the relationship between, on one side, 
objections about migrant worker supervision and monitoring and, on the other, personal 
safety, harassment, and violence. These were identified during the coding process. A 
secondary set of concerns were identified in the coding process. These relate to the impact 
on, first, residential property values; second, the use and enjoyment of private premises; 
and third, water usage, sewage, and wider concerns of environmental impacts. These hold 
significance in the context of historical spatial matters (including racialized spatialization) 
relating to belonging and marginalization in Canadian settler colonialism. It is useful 
to pause to reflect on the claims of the lone supporter. In a rhetorical flourish, the lone 
supporter bases his defense of the housing proposal on the economic benefits that accrue 
from migrant labour-subsidized, agricultural production in the area. See Email from RK to 
Norfolk County Council (23 November 2011) in Application, supra note 3. It states:
Ask the farmers (if you don’t already know) how valuable these workers are to Norfolk 
County—and getting their crops planted, harvested. Ask the farmers, (if you don’t already 
know) why they [can’t find] reliable local workers to do [the] jobs; [a]sk the businesses in 
Norfolk (if you don’t already know) what it means to have these workers here, spending their 
money. You cannot, must not, reject a proposal based on centuries old prejudices. You cannot, 
must not, reject a proposal based [on] hypothetical fears and assumptions. Those are not facts.
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or with the existence of migrant workers in the community and everything this 
is perceived to entail. I maintain that, although bound together, ultimately it is 
fear of the shared existence with these “foreign” labouring bodies—the racialized, 
unfree, migrant Other—that underwrites residents’ objections. Even where the 
interventions expressly concern the bunk house rules, I argue that residents are 
opposed to the existence of racialized migrant workers in their community.    
A. MIGRANT WORKER SUPERVISION AND MONITORING
The first identified basis of objection relates to the supervision and monitoring 
of migrant workers by Norfolk Potato owners. One submission asked, “If the 
approval is passed, what measures will [be put] in place to monitor the number 
of workers that will be temporarily living at this location?”88 Another expressed 
explicit need for supervision of the workers: “I understand in a recent article that 
the co-owner of the Potato Company found it outlandish that one would suggest 
that direct supervision of these men is necessary. I find it absolutely naive to think 
that any large grouping of people will not have issues.”89 Another submission 
(referenced at the outset of this piece), despite recognizing the exclusionary 
connotations of such a proposal, ultimately dismissed these concerns in favour of 
farmer supervision.90
The supporter’s intervention extends to encompass the economic benefits accruing from the 
potato growing operation, remarking that:
The potato company provides jobs, pays taxes, has spent money on facilities—and oh yes, 
grows food! The company pays significant money to bring these workers here and house 
them—because they are a reliable work force. The school proposal will pay property taxes, 
provide housing for the workers willing to do the job and; [t]he workers, as we all know, spend 
countless thousands of dollars in this community. Those are the facts (ibid).
The submission rejected outright claims about increased violent and illicit activities caused by 
the existence of migrant workers: “Please, don’t make Norfolk a laughing stock by listening and 
succumbing to unfounded talk of violence, vandalism and heaven’s knows what else” (ibid). 
Taken together, the lone supporter’s expressed claims, at first glance, challenge competing 
sentiments held more widely. Those sentiments posit, at once, the necessity of migrant labour 
in contemporary agricultural production and the security threat posed by invading outside 
forces on a pristine and unsuspecting local community. The co-existence of these seemingly 
conflictual sentiments owes to the capacity of capitalism to turn tension into productive value 
or utility primarily for the purpose of capital accumulation.
88. Letter from KG & LG to Norfolk County Council (5 December 2011) in 
Application, supra note 3.
89. Email from KB to Norfolk County Council (2 December 2011) in Application, supra note 3. 
My search did not turn up a newspaper article to corroborate this claim.
90. Letter from KG & LG to Norfolk County Council (5 December 2011) in 
Application, supra note 3.
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Remarking on the “need for armies of offshore labour” emerging out of the 
growth of large-scale farming operations, one resident asks: “Where do you put 
all these men?” “The answer,” as the resident responds, “is not in the middle of our 
beautiful hamlet of Windham Centre. If these big rich land owners want these big 
operations they should deal with the workers themselves on their own farms and 
not put them here out of their sight and supervision.”91 Other responses justified 
the need for worker supervision by couching concerns about the destruction 
of the family environment in concerns about worker safety and well-being. A 
submission framed it in terms of an expectation of worker supervision: “[A]s far 
as I know offshore workers are suppose[d] to be supervised by their employer … 
how are they suppose[d] to supervise them when they are not on the farmer[’]
s property and there is no one around to check on them[?]”92 Others, while not 
explicitly referencing supervision, still expressed similar concerns.93
Another call for supervision emerges around the criminal activities 
that people visiting workers are said to be engaged in: “The migrant workers 
themselves may not be the evil that we residents fear, but the company that 
comes to visit the men from surrounding cities, bringing with them the drugs, 
prostitution and crime that many who live in rural hamlets had hoped to avoid 
by choosing to live here.”94 Two residents acknowledge that: “Over the years we 
noticed that the majority of workers were isolated from the community—only 
a few workers became friendly faces who waved hello and stopped for a chat.”95 
91. Email from HG to Norfolk County Council (30 November 2011) in Application, supra 
note 3. The resident goes on to note, “Here in Windham Centre, neighbours lean on fences 
talking about the weather and the children run and play freely. A great family environment 
will be destroyed, but what do these land owners care, we’re just the Little Man!!!” (ibid). 
Similarly, another resident notes, “This company has 800 acres and several farms, are you 
telling me that they cannot find a spot for their own men on some of their already owned 
land[?] This is a hamlet.” See Email from KB to Norfolk County Council (2 December 
2011) in Application, supra note 3.
92. Email from AS to Norfolk County Council (4 December 2011) in Application, supra note 3.
93. One submission raised concerns about the changes that would come from rapid growth 
of the potato growing business and the challenges of assimilation: “What does an 
overnight population growth of 50% do to the hamlet?  How can that many people 
possibly be assimilated into the community – especially when they are temporary 
residents?” See Letter from ED & SD to Norfolk County Council (29 November 2011) in 
Application, supra note 3.
94. Letter from IB to Norfolk County Council (22 November 2011) in Application, supra note 
3. Not all of the responses made explicit reference to the involvement of workers or “the 
company” in supposedly illicit behaviour.
95. Letter from ED & SD to Norfolk County Council (29 November 2011) in 
Application, supra note 3.
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At the same time, they point to the economic importance of migrant workers 
in rural development. Overall, their “experiences with agricultural workers as 
neighbours is not negative. But the effect, within the hamlet, of workers who 
live on property where their employer also resides could be vastly different than 
the effect of workers living totally separate from their employer.”96 They go on 
to depict growers as serving a mediation or liaison role between workers and 
local residents: 
Migrant agricultural workers are valuable to our county, but the workers face 
unique challenges. These temporary residents, experience cultural differences, 
perhaps language barriers, and are unfamiliar with local laws and public services. A 
good employer acts as a sponsor for the workers—ensuring the workers’ rights are 
protected, that their personal and medical needs are met. The farmer/employer also 
acts as a liaison between the community and the agricultural workers helping to 
resolve any disputes or misunderstandings between the workers and the community. 
An absent landlord/employer cannot possibly do that job adequately, thereby, 
placing the workers and the community at risk.97  
B. PERSONAL SAFETY, SEXUAL HARASSMENT, PHYSICAL VIOLENCE, AND 
OTHER ILLICIT ACTIVITIES
The second category of objection encapsulates concerns about personal safety 
in general and sexual harassment, physical violence, and other illicit behaviour 
in particular. Residents’ personal safety concerns centred around the perception 
that the existence of migrant workers in the community will have a traumatic, 
destabilizing effect. In the words of one resident, “We moved to this lovely little 
hamlet of Windham Centre because it was so quiet, and safe for our children. 
… Permission to turn this building into migrant housing would forever alter and 
ruin our lovely little hamlet.”98
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid. Similarly articulated in terms of concern for worker well-being, a respondent remarked, 
“The migrant workers may or may not need to be supervised but someone has to be 
responsible for their health and welfare and this would probably not be the case if they 
were allowed to be housed in the former school.” See Letter from IB to Norfolk County 
Council (22 November 2011) in Application, supra note 3. Another set of respondents at 
once registered disapproval while refraining from providing an explanation: “[We] feel that 
Migrant Workers are needed and are valuable to the Norfolk County farming community.” 
Yet, as the respondent continues, “We strongly urge you to not allow the amendment to 
house agricultural workers … .” See Letter from KG & LG to Norfolk County Council (5 
December 2011) in Application, supra note 3 [emphasis omitted]. 
98. Email from PM to Norfolk County Council (4 December 2011) in Application, supra note 3.
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Again, certain residents’ concerns are bound up in the claim that Windham 
Centre is idyllic and by extension that residents engage in safe and acceptable 
behaviours in contrast to the dangerous and destructive behaviours of workers.99 
A more pointed statement is expressed by another resident: “I should not have to 
be afraid every day for my safety and the safety of my children.”100 As that same 
resident explains, “My husband is a construction worker who is usually gone 
from dawn [un]til dusk during the same months these people come to work on 
local farms, can you assure our safety when nobody will even be watching over 
these men?”101 And she goes on to add: 
I read the statistics in the paper and our police force is not big enough to have officers 
on hand at all times to handle the caseload that will come out of this decision. Are 
you going to hire more officers and make sure that there [are] always officers on 
hand in Windham Centre to enforce the law and make sure they are following the 
laws and treating the people here how they deserve to be treated[?]102
Whereas certain objections make general claims about the housing project’s 
impact on the safety of residents, especially women and children, others also 
advance specific objections based on allegations of sexual harassment and physical 
violence (or the threat of it) by workers against residents, again mostly young 
people and women, and workers’ engagement in illicit behaviour. To cite the 
above respondent at length: 
[T]he behaviour of these people is truly frightening and morally wrong. For some 
reason every woman wants to be hit on, be touched walking by, talked to like we are 
pieces of meat and completely sexualized in many of these men[’]s opinion. I know 
that this may sound harsh, however this is the majority opinion … .”103
In a particularly lengthy submission, a resident recounted a series of troubling 
stories to illustrate her claim that workers will disturb community order. As she 
99. As one resident put it: “This is a small community comprised of many elderly people with a 
few new families who have relocated here with children. I am sure many of them have moved 
here for the same reason as I did, to get back to what family is truly about and raise them in a 
safe environment.” Letter from TP & NP to Norfolk County Council (4 December 2011) in 
Application, supra note 3. Another respondent notes: “My next [b]iggest concern is the safety 
for my children and my neighbours[’] kids. … [R]ight now it is a safe place for my kids to 
ride their bikes or play with their friends [be]cause there is hardly any traffic … .” See Email 
from AS to Norfolk County Council (4 December 2011) in Application, supra note 3.
100. Letter from TP & NP to Norfolk County Council (4 December 2011) in 
Application, supra note 3.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid.
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put it: “My 14 and 15 year old daughters were on a bike ride and several of 
these immigrant workers pulled down their pants and showed them their penises, 
grabbing themselves and making obscene gestures and comments to them … .”104 
As the resident goes on to ask: 
Will I not be able to jog in the early morning or let my children play in the park 
after dark? Will I have to worry every moment my daughters are out of my sight 
because of the way these men sexualize the women in the communities they enter? 
I can promise that should you allow this bunkhouse to happen many things will 
change. Our community is so small and peaceful, why should that change so that 
some farmers from outside of our community save some money[?]105
A different resident suggests that “[i]ncreasing our population with these 
workers will only increase the possibility and opportunity for violence, vandalism, 
104. Ibid. According to the resident, “My son was biking with his sister to take her to a friend[’]
s house and when he was on his return trip home a group of these workers were harassing 
him, trying to call him on to a fight, until the farmer came over to see what the commotion 
was and told them to get back to work” (ibid). The resident also recounts a story of a woman 
store owner who “was accosted and sexually touched by a worker who came into the store” 
(ibid). In a second story, the resident recounts a situation where “my daughters were riding 
by and the men were advancing towards the road calling out to them and making obscene 
gestures and comments, another group of workers from another farm came and made 
sure they safely got by the farm” (ibid). The resident also notes, “All of the women in my 
community are afraid for their safety, a lot of men have to work very long hours either on 
their farms or away all together from Windham Centre, how do we protect ourselves from 
these behaviours[?]” (ibid). With reference to the surveillance of workers, the resident goes 
on to ask: “From what I understand [other local communities] have a curfew during farm 
season for the residents of the towns, will Windham Centre also have to have a curfew 
because of the behaviour of the people they are trying to house here?” (ibid). The resident 
goes on to say, “The men are worried because they will not be home to take care of their 
wives and daughters. Why should the residents of Windham Centre have our lives turned 
upside down?” (ibid). In expressing “fear” that the existence of the bunkhouse “would 
create more harm than good for everyone concerned,” a noted long-time resident similarly 
states: “I enjoy living in Windham Centre because it is a peaceful, quaint village. Allowing 
a bunkhouse, especially of such a large size for migrant farm workers in the centre of the 
village[,] would change the atmosphere of this small residential village.” See Letter from IB 
to Norfolk County Council (22 November 2011) in Application, supra note 3. Then the 
resident links this concern with the decline in housing property values: “All of my neighbours 
feel much the same way, not just in fearing the huge onslaught of migrant individuals in our 
community but in the resulting drop in property values as homes are sold or not sold after 
being put up for sale after such a change as this would take place, I don’t know if I would 
want to continue to live here” (ibid) [emphasis omitted].
105. Letter from TP & NP to Norfolk County Council (4 December 2011) in 
Application, supra note 3.
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harassment and a number of other unwanted and undesirable scenarios.”106 
Another resident asks a more pointed query: “Will they be bringing in young 
ladies for sexual gratification the way I have seen people bringing them into 
downtown Simcoe for the men?”107 According to another respondent, 
the local police may as well set up a station here in our community to make it a 
shorter drive out here for all of the calls myself and the neighbours will be making 
every[]time ourselves or one of [our] children are sexually harassed, every[]time 
there is drug use, every[]time there is sexual solicitation by the women who come in 
to service these groups of men or any other type of illegal or disruptive, intolerable 
behaviour.108
That respondent also suggests “that when you get any large group of men, 
away from their families, there is a ‘mob mentality’ that can take effect. The 
‘cat calling’ and aggressive behaviour can get out of control.”109 And then, citing 
“concern for the welfare of my daughters and the many other young citizens of 
our small community,” she adds: “As a woman and a mother I am all too well 
aware of multiple instances of sexual harassment and lewd behaviour towards any 
woman. I myself have had an instance with a small group of 4 of these men trying 
to pick up my 12 year old daughter in our front yard!”110
IV. THE MATERIAL EFFECTS AND CONTEXT OF RESIDENTS’ 
RESPONSES 
In this final section, I situate the written responses of community residents in 
terms of material practices, outcomes, and context. Reflecting on the identified 
grounds of objection and attending to the discourses they draw upon and how 
they interact with each other, as well as to the meanings and understandings that 
can be drawn from these encounters, I read residents’ discursive objections as 
both ideological representations of the social world, in terms of how they classify 
productive and wider social relations, and as historical and ongoing material 
practices and effects of racialized Othering. Having broadly categorized these 
responses, we can begin to see patterns emerge that betray representations and 
106. Email from RV to Norfolk County Council (22 November 2011) in 
Application, supra note 3.
107. Letter from TP & NP to Norfolk County Council (4 December 2011) in Application, supra 
note 3. I take this as a reference to migrant workers in another, nearby community.
108. Email from RM to Norfolk County Council (4 December 2011) in Application, supra note 3.
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid.
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assumptions of the Other and Self. In particular, these representations convey 
socio-historico-legal understandings of the overlapping relationships between 
migrant workers and growers, between workers and Windham Centre residents, 
and between growers and residents. More profoundly, these representations 
enforce racialized class relations.
Through the ideological discourse of worker supervision and monitoring, 
residents legitimate the subjugation of migrant workers to growers. This occurs 
in two intersecting ways. First, a merging of the subjectivities of migrant workers 
with growers constructs migrant labour in a particular social role, one that does 
not exist outside of a steep hierarchical relationship with the grower-employer. 
Second, the worker supervision narrative also works alongside and in association 
with concerns about worker safety and well-being. In this way, the discourse 
bridges recognition of the need for and value of migrant workers on the one 
hand, expressed in terms of economic benefits accruing to the community, with 
a desire to disallow the zoning by-law amendment on the other.111 Even as certain 
residents acknowledge workers’ economic contributions or pose alternatives to the 
housing proposal, these interventions still maintain that growers hold ultimate 
responsibility for worker supervision. The housing proposal is viewed as allowing 
growers to shirk responsibility for their workers.112 Even though it also appears 
that many residents perceive Norfolk Potato as an outsider, the particular process 
of Othering legitimates the idea that as an accepted segment of the propertied 
class, and as ‘rightful’ occupiers of the land, growers have control of land. 
111. For a discussion of the economic “necessity” of migrant workers in Ontario agricultural 
production, see Basok, Mexican Harvesters, supra note 30 at 4. For a critical political 
economic analysis see Mark Thomas, “Labour Migration and Temporary Work: Canada’s 
Foreign-Worker Programs in the ‘New Economy’” in Norene J Pupo & Mark P Thomas, eds, 
Interrogating the New Economy: Restructuring Work in the 21st Century (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2010) 149. At best, certain respondents identify the economic contribution of 
migrant workers to the local economy.  Even the lone supporter’s intervention is framed on 
the “factual” premise of the economic benefits that derive for growers and local business, and 
the need for these workers is also framed in these terms. The paradox between claims to the 
economic importance of these workers to farmers and local business owners and to the wider 
economic development of community is contrasted with regulatory immobilization that 
contributes to their relative social isolation from citizens and near citizens. 
112. But the representational defining of the Other is necessarily reciprocal or dialectical and 
thus is a defining of Self.  Local residents are characterized as fair-minded, law-abiding, 
and rightful inhabitants of the community. The discourse conveys a sense of belonging 
tied to processes of racialized Othering. Further, the community is portrayed as safe 
and problem-free, or idyllic. Workers, in reciprocal terms, are perceived as threats to the 
existing social order. In this framing, there is no sense of a collective obligation to provide 
adequate housing.
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By extension, their ownership solidifies their control over labouring bodies 
utilized to cultivate that land. 
This ideological discourse of supervision functions together with the 
ideological discourse of personal and community safety and sexual harassment. 
When coupled with the former, expressions of deep concern for personal and 
community safety are discursively removed from negative connotations of work 
under the SAWP. Even on its own, the personal safety discourse turns on, at 
best, a suspicious posturing towards workers. In its most vitriolic articulations, 
personal safety characterizes the existence of workers as a physical threat to 
local residents’ well-being. Notwithstanding the complexity of responses, the 
concerns of residents focus on the prospective existence of migrant workers in 
Windham Centre. In the overwhelming expressions of opposition, the lives 
of workers are portrayed as, at once, insignificant and deviant. This portrayal 
constructs the existence and circulation of workers in the community as serving 
to disturb tranquility and to render the community unsafe. Workers therefore 
are largely objectified in the oppositional responses of residents. When they are 
granted subjectivity in residents’ discourse, it occurs in ways that render them 
hyper-sexualized deviants or predators.
The intersecting ideological discursive framings of worker supervision 
and personal and community safety also work to construct the presence and 
involvement of local residents in terms that refrain from problematizing their 
relationship with workers. The responses demonstrate an almost universal 
unwillingness to question migrant labour unfreedom. In addition to largely 
negative representations of workers, local residents construct their own presence 
and involvement in unfreedom in contradictory terms. The persistent threat of 
deportation and the heavy constraints on worker mobility are not addressed by 
the residents. Because the specific conditions of unfreedom are hardly referenced 
in residents’ discursive objections, these interventions amount to an erasure of 
hyper-exploitative work and living conditions. Labour unfreedom is instead 
mediated by discourses of personal safety of residents—especially of children and 
women—and of deviant sexual behaviours ranging from harassment to physical 
violence. Any uncertainty about workers is shrouded within these overwhelmingly 
fear-based intertextual references and representations. 
Finally, residents invoke at least two recurring racist colonial tropes: 
surveillance of the racialized Other (whereby that Other is an object of 
surveillance) and racialized worker sexual deviance —or what Angela Y. Davis 
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once referred to as “the timeworn myth of the Black rapist.”113 In mirroring 
these long-standing tropes, residents’ responses demean migrant farm workers 
through gross characterizations and assertions linked to, in the first instance, 
shiftiness and, in the latter, hyper-sexualization. Taken together, these tropes, 
which assume a “victim blaming” of sorts, are read from the racialized, unfree, 
migrant construction of labouring bodies in the SAWP. 
The fears of community members are not merely gross generalizations 
conveyed to portray all migrant workers in highly charged, racist terms. In fact, 
they are based on historically specific, hyper-exploitative practices of unfree 
labour relations. These include the immobilization of workers through precarious 
migratory status and the fundamentally exclusionary impetus of territorial 
belonging that, individually and together, work to distinguish a positively-defined 
“us” and Self, contingent upon racist formulations enforced through the SAWP, 
from an amorphously characterized “them” or Other. The hypothetical threat, 
not of the existence and prevalence of sexual harassment or gendered violence 
in social life in Canada but of the belief that all migrant workers necessarily are 
dangerous predators, overwhelms claims about worker economic contributions 
(not that this should be the basis for justifying their existence), let alone about 
worker subsistence and survival. As geographer Don Mitchell once put it in an 
analogous context, “the question is whether [local residents’] fear or discomfort 
113. Women, Race & Class (New York: Vintage Books, 1983) at 182. On racist colonial tropes 
and their effects, see Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, supra note 1, ch 5. See also Anne 
McClintock, Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest (New York: 
Routledge, 1995). On how these tropes have played out in mid-twentieth-century Canada, 
see David Austin, Fear of a Black Nation: Race, Sex, and Security in Sixties Montreal (Toronto: 
Between the Lines, 2013), ch 8. Davis should not be read as claiming that black men do 
not engage in sexual violence and harassment against women but as contesting that this is 
a naturalized extension of their racialized identities. The failure to take the personal safety 
and sexual harassment discourse seriously threatens to ignore patriarchy and violence against 
women in addition to forms of personal violence against children and other people, which 
are not insignificant within contemporary social life. The challenge, then, is not that these 
sorts of behaviours do not exist in contemporary rural—or for that matter, urban—Canada 
but that overly broad claims work to portray all migrant workers in these terms. But, in a 
different respect, it should also be taken as a challenge to overly sterilized accounts of migrant 
worker lives, which, notwithstanding how well-meaning, remove consideration of workers’ 
intimate engagements with community members and with each other. Little attention has 
been paid to the social reproduction dimensions of agricultural labour migration to Canada 
in relation to social provisioning back home and to how socially reproductive labour is 
attended to while in Canada, through intra-group relations of workers and relations between 
workers and community residents.  
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should be allowed to dictate the destruction of the means of survival for other 
people”114—it must not.
The destruction of the means of survival—a deed integral to law’s violence—
connotes both material effects as well as material context. Both sets of ideological 
discourses, supervision and personal or community safety, produce significant 
material effects. Residents’ oppositional responses provide an example of what 
might be termed “language-in-action” in that they are subsumed within a set 
of practices designed to enforce not only difference but subjugation.115 These 
practices function to legitimate and sustain unfree labour relations and conditions 
in agricultural production. A crucial outcome is that workers are rendered as 
objects with negated subjectivities and their agency is effectively undermined. 
With respect to material context, the challenge rests with characterizing 
residents’ legal consciousness as not sufficiently contextualized; as dematerialized 
in its deployment of racism and in its disregard for migrant labour unfreedom. In 
an effort to properly contextualize the interventions of Windham Centre residents 
in the lived existence of SAWP workers, we are confronted with the undeniable 
absence of migrant workers’ voices in urban planning and wider political 
democratic processes in Canada. The consultation did not meaningfully solicit 
the words, sentiments, or understandings of workers. Nor are Canadian planning 
and political processes responsive to the material conditions of temporary labour 
migration. The crucial issue of the “control” of the production of public discourse 
on the migrant housing proposal, including “who has access to the fundamental 
power resource of public discourse,”116 undeniably registers here. In the by-law 
amendment process, migrant workers are “talked about” but not heard from, 
and they enjoy no direct or meaningful input into, not to mention control over, 
the “contents and style” of this particular production of legal discourse.117 This 
silence is crucial to law’s violence.118
114. “The Annihilation of Space by Law: The Roots and Implications of Anti-Homeless Laws” 
(1997) 29:3 Antipode 303 at 331, note 31.  
115. The term “language-in-action” is borrowed from Jan Bloomaert. See Jan Bloomaert, 
Discourse: A Critical Introduction (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 2.
116. Teun A van Dijk, Discourse and Power (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) at viii.
117. Ibid [emphasis omitted]. The significance of this sort of directed discourse is that it does 
not merely capture “the public mind,” as van Dijk suggests, it also has profound effects 
on shaping the representations, lived experience, and social outcomes of migrant workers. 
An important dimension of the analysis relates to the deeply exclusionary structure of 
the planning legal regime. The privileging of residents’ voices over workers’ is evident in 
the explicit opportunity granted to, and solicitation of, existing community members for 
consultation and participation in the official process. This occurs to racialized effects.
118. Hay, “Law’s Violence,” supra note 72.
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In this case, the violence of law perpetuated on migrant workers is carried 
out through land use planning law. Far from displacing the privileging of private 
property and citizen participation, the public consultation process (which 
is linked to the planning regime’s emphasis on local autonomy in decision 
making119) solidifies what could be termed the racialized “propertied citizenship” 
foundations of the regime and wider social relations.120 While the foundations 
are apparent in the planning regime’s adoption of participatory mechanisms 
devised on racialized propertied exclusionary terms, they also are evident in how 
a “bunk house” is defined in planning law, absent meaningful engagement with 
the workers who are confined to it. Through the planning regime, ideological 
discursive representations of migrant labour are converted into material effects. 
The most obvious outcome, the withdrawal of the housing by-law amendment 
application,121 materializes in the furtherance of worker immobilization. Just 
as private property ownership in capitalism grants growers the authority to 
determine the work and social lives of migrant workers, it also gives residents the 
authority to intervene in the by-law amendment application. 
A reliance on the authority of residents, a segment of the propertied 
citizenry, occurred over the authority of the specific grower Norfolk Potato. These 
residents’ interventions collectively proved successful. Nonetheless, for all but 
the dissenting resident, the interventions also served to perpetuate the authority 
of agri-capital over agri-labour more generally. Claims of the need for worker 
supervision and resident personal safety extended labour unfreedom from the 
employment sphere to wider living arrangements and practices. With the support 
of the planning regime, unfreedom has been stretched to encompass the whole of 
social life of migrant agricultural labour in Canada.122 
119. Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, “Citizens’ Guide: The Planning Act” 
(2010), online: <www.mah.gov.on.ca/AssetFactory.aspx?did=5920>.
120. I have borrowed the term “propertied citizenship” from Ananya Roy, who discusses the 
historical emergence of the American paradigm of propertied citizenship. See Ananya 
Roy, “Paradigms of Propertied Citizenship: Transnational Techniques of Analysis” (2003) 
38:4 Urb Aff Rev 463. I deploy the term to refer to the intersection of national territorial 
conceptions of belonging, rights of private property ownership, and processes of racialization 
and whiteness. These intersecting bases of authority are bestowed on private property owners 
in housing, land, and labour power deployment.
121. See Sonnenberg, “Bunkhouse proposal,” supra note 2.
122. There are analogous examples of this occurring elsewhere in the world in the contemporary 
moment. For instance, internal labour migrants in southeastern China find that the whole 
of social life is shaped through a “dormitory labor regime.” Ngai Pun & Jenny Chan, “The 
Spatial Politics of Labor in China: Life, Labor, and a New Generation of Migrant Workers” 
(2013) 112:1 S Atlantic Q 179.
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Windham Centre residents collaborated to produce racist exclusion through 
the differential inclusion of agricultural labouring bodies from the Caribbean. 
However, to see this outcome strictly as an attempt by local residential actors to 
govern another set of ‘foreign’ actors, without accounting for the formative role 
of the state, is to miss how labour unfreedom is constructed in, is transmitted 
through, and envelops local and global scales. The bunk house rules cannot be read 
apart from the web of rules governing the full range of conditions and relations 
of labour unfreedom.123 That residents’ overwhelming opposition, coupled with 
a reliance on the provincial planning regime, re-inscribes and extends labour 
unfreedom does not give sufficient credit to the role of the nation state in laying 
the groundwork for these processes to occur. The planning regime—and the 
overarching project of Canadian national state formation and perpetuation—
provides a crucial means for the continuing production of labour unfreedom. 
After all, the racist exclusionary outcome produced in Norfolk County remains 
consistent with the ongoing racialized hierarchies of the Canadian national state 
project. The Canadian state project, as evident in residents’ legal consciousness, 
actively constructs the imagined community of Canada not just defined in terms 
of language, as Benedict Anderson famously suggested, but on racialized grounds 
of national belonging.124 This occurs through processes and practices that uphold 
differentials in work and social life on the basis of intersecting markers of 
racialization property ownership and citizenship status. 
It is in the extension of labour unfreedom from growers’ labour power 
deployment to the entire social life of migrant workers that Canada’s SAWP can be 
deemed to be creating “slave-like” or indentured conditions and relations. In the 
residents’ submissions, workers begin to resemble the personal property or chattel 
of growers, who in turn are portrayed as inevitably and necessarily in positions 
of domination over them. Local residents come to exist largely outside of this 
skewed relation of racialized propertied citizenship. However, the residents also 
insert their own subjectivity into these relations in defence not of the subjectivity 
and agency of migrant workers but of their own property rights. This move occurs 
through an assertion of the propertied authority of growers over farm lands and 
123. In this respect, the material production of labouring bodies in racialized, unfree, and 
migrant terms flows out of, but is not relegated to, nor contained within, the legal regimes 
conventionally understood to govern immigration, employment, labour, and land use 
planning. These legal regimes largely are regarded as distinct spheres and thus lack the 
conceptual capacity to fully account for the legal regulation of migrant labour.
124. Satzewich, Racism, supra note 24 at 46. This discussion revises Benedict Anderson’s classic 
account by noting how certain states are conceived not only through language but in 
racialized terms.
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chattel property. The residents’ language-in-action reflects a desire to criminalize 
and police black migrant labouring bodies in ways that demonstrate a “racialized 
structural inequality” or economic apartheid in contemporary Canada and that 
harken back to new world regimes of enslavement.125 In this respect, the outcome 
is not merely an objectification of the labouring efforts and capacities of workers. 
The objectification of labour power is, after all, a defining feature of capitalist 
relations of production. When understood as an attempt to undercut or negate 
the self-determined subjectivity and agency of migrant workers, residents’ reliance 
on racist colonial tropes of surveillance and hyper-sexualization works to deepen 
the immobilization of workers. The immobilization of black labouring bodies 
betrays the deep impacts of an ongoing and renewed—not dying—colonialism.
What then are the prospects for the liberation of racialized, unfree migrant 
labouring bodies under the neo-colonial regime of the SAWP? Any meaningful 
challenge to residents’ oppositional representations requires a focus on the insular 
nature of their legal consciousness, which belittles migrant labour unfreedom. 
This insular legal consciousness, forged in racialized propertied citizenship, may 
have gained momentum under neo-liberal capitalism as ownership of single-unit 
family dwelling housing—and the monetary value of that property—mark 
defining characteristics of not only wealth but social belonging in Canada.126   
Hence the racialized propertied citizenship basis of Windham Centre 
residents’ legal consciousness has faced intensifying pressures under 
neo-liberalism. Property-holding residents of communities like Windham Centre 
entrench neo-liberal capitalism coupled with the national territorial project of 
belonging in their efforts to preserve housing property values and to portray 
theirs as a tranquil hamlet. Intra-working class conflict plays out in and through 
a reactionary politics of exclusion designed to exile difference. This difference 
has come to be termed NIMBYism (Not In My Backyard-ism), in which the 
125. Grace-Edward Galabuzi, Canada’s Economic Apartheid: The Social Exclusion of Racialized 
Groups in the New Century (Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press, 2006) at xiii-xiv.
126. In the forty-year neo-liberal assault, labouring communities across the urban-rural divide 
have become deeply indebted to finance capital through mortgages and consumer credit. 
This expansion of household credit, flowing from low interest rates, has meant dramatically 
rising personal debt levels with household debt-to-income ratios (i.e., after-tax income to 
total debts outstanding) growing rapidly. The existence of cheap, readily available credit backs 
consumption, and it is this debt-financed consumer spending that serves as a core driver of 
the macroeconomy. In the absence of an adequate monetary and social wage, and indeed 
faced with a four-decade long period of stagnating real wages, the deepening indebtedness 
of working-class communities is intertwined with consumer credit and mortgages. See e.g. 
Fletcher Baragar & Mario Seccareccia, “Financial Restructuring: Implications of Recent 
Canadian Macroeconomic Developments” (2008) 82 Stud Polit Econ 61.
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home-owning masses and their associations police the borders on their property 
fence lines.127 A deep interplay is forged between policing at the territorial 
borders of the national state and at the housing property line. And here we see 
that racialization, and indeed racism, entrenched within the ongoing project of 
Canadian national state building, is drawn upon to mediate and enforce the 
value of private residential property over and against the value of the means of 
survival of migrant agricultural workers. It is in this material context that migrant 
workers must secure liberation.  
One cannot contest the racialized class dimensions of residents’ legal 
consciousness absent a focus on material context. Such an approach downplays or 
ignores the deep-rootedness of labour unfreedom as a process of immobilization 
and hyper-exploitation, impeding local residents from developing understandings 
of how law subjugates migrant agricultural workers in Canada, and how, even in 
the face of certain residents’ disdain for growers, it facilitates grower domination 
and migrant worker subjugation. An anti-racist, historical materialist legal 
consciousness must work to reposition community residents to see how the 
continuation of domination and hyper-exploitation undermine both their 
own life chances and those of migrant workers. It is on these terms that the 
transformation of residents’ legal consciousness must occur and that (certain?) 
residents might transform their everyday practices to struggle through the 
complex and trying work of solidarity with migrant workers. 
However, an anti-racist, historical materialist analysis cannot focus solely and 
intently on the perpetrators and beneficiaries (however differential those benefits 
may be) without a commitment to opening space for the assertion of collective—
and, through this, individual—human agency. That said, the glaring absence of 
migrant worker voices should not be taken as, nor elevated to, a liberal assertion 
of the need for greater voice or recognition in the absence of attentiveness to 
collective action. Indeed, the normative goal of meaningful collective action is 
contingent on the encouragement of anti-racist and anti-capitalist oppositional 
praxis and struggle committed not “exclusively to persuad[ing] those who 
articulate racism that they are ‘wrong’” but instead to the transformation of 
racialized economic and political relations endemic to capitalism.128
What is needed, therefore, is to construct an explicitly confrontational 
politics committed to, if not driven by, a transformative agenda of sustained 
and concerted collective action aimed at contesting the entire gamut of working, 
127. See Mike Davis, City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles (London: Verso, 1990).
128. Miles & Brown, supra note 16 at 107 [emphasis omitted].   
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housing, and life conditions.129 Elsewhere, I have identified preliminary examples 
of the actually existing resistance of migrant farm workers, which occurs 
typically in disjointed and covert forms. I have also called for a commitment to 
consolidating, broadening, and fortifying that resistance.130 At its heart, the agenda 
must centralize—but not essentialize—the role assumed by racism in capitalist 
valuation, in private property ownership, in the production of labouring bodies, 
and in national territorial belonging; or, more succinctly, in the constitution of 
the social world.
V. TOWARDS A CONCLUSION
Who live here in this cider house … ? Who grind them apples, who press the cider, 
who clean up the mess, and who just plain live here… just breathin’ in the vinegar? 
Somebody who don’t live here made them rules. Them rules ain’t for us. We the ones 
who make up them rules. We makin’ our own rules, every day. Ain’t that right … ?131
I have sought to demonstrate the ways in which written opposition to a migrant 
workers’ housing proposal in Ontario draws on understandings and assumptions 
about the legal regulation of migrant agricultural labour. In this opposition, 
migrant workers have come face-to-face with the language of the civilizing 
129. The limits of mainstream approaches has a great deal to do with the way in which, in the 
post-war period, legal scholars have come to understand how labour is regulated in law, or 
more properly labour law, solely through the legal regimes of the contract of employment, 
statutory collective bargaining, and employment standards, the regulatory regimes seen 
to govern employment. Migrant labour, among other forms of labour, by virtue of their 
tangential relationship to the aforementioned legal regimes and to collective bargaining 
in particular, are relegated to the peripheral encounters at the edge of the scholarly field. 
This, as I argue elsewhere, stems from epistemological politics uninterested in—if not 
deliberately ignorant of—the racialized and gendered impacts of workers’ lived experiences. 
Support therefore must be given to the work of groups like Justicia For Migrant Workers, 
an anti-capitalist activist organizing collective that both supports migrant worker 
self-organization and fights against worker isolation, and others like No One Is Illegal, which 
build grassroots opposition to the racist immigration policies and practices of the imperialist 
Canadian state. For an incisive account of Canadian imperialism and its effects at home and 
abroad, see Gordon, Imperialist Canada, supra note 48.
130. Adrian A Smith, “Racialized In Justice: The Legal and Extra-Legal Struggles of Migrant 
Agricultural Workers In Canada” (2015) 31:2 Windsor YB Access to Just 15; Adrian A Smith 
“Legal Consciousness and Resistance in Caribbean Seasonal Agricultural Workers” (2005) 
20:2 CJLS 95. As I argue in these articles, further research is needed on how workers respond 
to the racism they encounter.
131. John Irving, “The Cider House Rules,” Screenplay (1999), online: Screenplays for You <sfy.
ru/?script=cider_house_rules>. 
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nation. Extending beyond mere textual considerations to contextual matters, 
I undertake an anti-racist, historical materialist examination of law’s violent 
effects and context. The overwhelming opposition of Windham Centre residents 
advances a particularly troubling pair of legal consciousness representational 
claims. Claims that migrant workers should or must be supervised and 
monitored by growers and that the workers’ presence in the community poses 
a physical, sexual, or associated criminal threat lend legitimizing support to the 
hyper-exploitative nature of Canada’s seasonal agrarian migrant labour regime. 
These claims replicate expressed fears of Canadian state officials in the lead-up 
to the creation of the SAWP in 1966, when the introduction of black people 
into whitened Canadian social life was deemed socially divisive.132 All of this 
harkens back to tired, racist colonialist tropes trading on the need for surveillance 
and on the hyper-sexualization of racialized labouring bodies. Residents’ legal 
consciousness encodes an acceptance of not merely the circumscribed legal 
rights and entitlements of migrant agricultural workers but more profoundly 
the way migrant agrarian labour production is organized and labouring bodies 
are rendered racialized and unfree. As such, labouring bodies are subjugated 
to growers and dependent on capitalist market relations and exchange. The 
insular and restrained legal consciousness of residents legitimates, reproduces, 
and in important ways extends labour unfreedom in all its forms, including 
social isolation and immobilization. Mediating and reproducing unfree labour 
relations and conditions for workers, the residents’ legal consciousness assumes 
a “colour-coded”133 modality informed by racialized propertied citizenship. In 
Windham Centre, a white propertied citizenship enforced a process of racialized 
Othering in which migrant labouring bodies were exorcised and exiled from both 
the imagined and actual community, not only of Windham Centre but of Canada 
at large.134 Residents’ interventions bolster and preserve the coercive politico-legal 
practices of the Canadian state. Through their racialized representations of 
migrant worker housing, set within the ongoing context of racialized Canadian 
national state formation, residents extend the immobilization of labouring 
132. Satzewich, Racism, supra note 24 at 191.
133. See Constance Backhouse, Colour-Coded: A Legal History of Racism in Canada, 1900-1950 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999).
134. In line with the denial of decent housing to migrant workers, area residents give credence to 
the Canadian state’s intensified denial-of-services attack perpetuated against migrant workers 
in areas such as parental benefits under employment insurance. See Chris Ramsaroop, “The 
Case for Unemployment Insurance Benefits for Migrant Agricultural Workers in Canada” 
in Aziz Choudry & Adrian A Smith, eds, Unfree Labour? Struggles of Migrant and Immigrant 
Workers In Canada, [unpublished]. 
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bodies. The material effect is the perpetuation of growers’ control not merely 
of labour power but in fact over racialized and unfree migrant labouring bodies. 
A great deal more needs to be contemplated here—the depths and complexity 
of the means of migrant worker survival, the construction of a neo-colonial regime 
of foreign labour pacification, the Canadian state’s claiming of sovereign authority 
within ongoing settler colonialism, and, in this latter respect, fundamentally, how 
through the SAWP the “unfree migrant Other” is foisted upon the “Indigenous 
Other.” The need for deeper contemplation renders it difficult to arrive at a 
definitive conclusion. But the imposition of the bunk house rules, just like the 
cider house rules as the dialogue opening this final section suggests, occurs on 
the basis of illegitimate authority of growers and the Canadian state. The denial 
of adequate housing to migrant agricultural workers, the destruction of their 
means of survival, including especially the gendered and racialized nature of 
social reproduction, forms the material context and basis for contestation and 
for directed anti-racist class struggle. It is time for us to rethink and contest the 
racist propertied citizenship basis upon which the rules governing all our lives 
persist. The challenge is for us all to support migrant workers and their allies in a 
transformative praxis that—if I can borrow something the writer Isabel Allende 
once said—aims not to make life better, but to make it good.135 And so, the task 
rests with confronting the racist class articulations of contemporary capitalism 
and to support worker self-organization and allied organizations committed not 
to betterment but to making good on the promise of a life free of unfreedom. 
135. Ted Talks, “Tales of Passion” (March 2007), online: <www.ted.com/talks/isabel_allende_
tells_tales_of_passion?language=en#t-186036> (discussing the need for a deepening of 
feminist energy among women and young men to create “an almost perfect world”).
